

*Bridgely*

*The Department of State*

# bulletin

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## The Struggle for German Unity

by Henry B. Coe

Postwar efforts to unify Germany may be divided into two general phases. The first encompassed the period 1945-48 in which German unification was sought on the basis of the economic and political principles of the Potsdam Agreement. These attempts came to a halt in 1948 with the imposition of the Berlin blockade and the breakdown of Four-Power control. The second phase is represented by the efforts during 1949 and 1950 to carry out the much more limited steps toward unification called for in the *modus vivendi* for Germany agreed upon at the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1949, and the Western Allied and West German initiative in 1951 and 1952 which culminated in the appointment by the General Assembly of the United Nations of a commission to investigate and determine whether conditions for free elections exist throughout Germany. This article deals primarily with the latter phase of developments relating to German unification.

At the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in May 1949, the delegations of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom offered a proposal for restoring the political and economic unity of Germany.<sup>1</sup> The Three-Power proposal called for the unification of Germany in accordance with the Bonn Constitution, which had been promulgated a short time before, by the making of appropriate arrangements enabling the states of the Soviet zone to accede to it. The proposal further stipulated a number of principles which would apply to such accession of the states of the eastern zone, such as freedom of person, freedom of speech, freedom for all democratic political parties, freedom of elections, and the independence of the judiciary. In addition, the proposal provided for the prohibition of "all police

formations exercising political activities." The proposal also included provisions for a Four-Power Occupation Statute with reserved powers, a quadripartite High Commission operating with majority vote, an agreement prohibiting certain industries and restricting production in others, provision for the delivery of reparations, and the return to German ownership of industrial enterprises acquired after May 8, 1945.

The Soviet proposal for economic and political unity called for the re-establishment of the quadripartite Allied Control Council on its former basis as the organ representing supreme authority in Germany, as well as the re-establishment of the Inter-Allied Kommandatura. The Soviet proposal also provided for (a) the creation of an all-German State council on the basis of the economic organs existing at the time in the eastern and western zones of Germany and (b) the re-establishment of the Magistrat of Berlin.

No agreement was reached at the Paris meeting on the question of German unity.

### Intensified Soviet Propaganda

Following the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Soviets intensified their propaganda campaign designed to convince the German people that the U.S.S.R. and the Communist parties in East and West Germany were the only true proponents of German unification, the conclusion of a peace treaty, and the withdrawal of occupation forces. Through the persistent efforts of the "National Front" committees and the Soviet and Communist-controlled German press in both East and West Germany, the Soviets tried to keep the initiative on German unity. The Soviets have sought to gain popular support through appeals which follow the traditional lines of the policy of German-Russian

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of July 4, 1949, p. 857.



friendship of Bismarck, Gustav Stresemann's idea of Germany as a bridge between East and West, and attempts at German-Russian cooperation during the Weimar Republic.

Faced with these developments and impressed by the necessity for restating the position of the Western Allies on the reunification issue, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany released a statement calling for the political reunification of Germany on the basis of free, all-German elections. Issued on February 28, 1950, the McCloy statement deprecated the Soviet device of "the so-called National Front" as a "means to democratic unity" and decried Soviet exploitation of the natural wish of the German people for unity while denying to them the free and democratic processes by which unity can be obtained. Mr. McCloy also emphasized the readiness of the United States to "assist the German people to achieve unity based on true democratic principles and reflecting the aspirations of the entire German nation."

#### **Action for German Unity**

On March 22 the Federal Republic of Germany issued a statement which supported the U.S. High Commissioner's proposal, and embodied a concrete program for the achievement of German unity.<sup>2</sup> This program called for: (1) all-German elections for a National Constituent Assembly to be proclaimed following the promulgation of an election law by the four occupying powers; (2) supervision of the elections to the National Assembly by election commissions established by the four occupation powers or representatives of the United Nations; and (3) preparation by this Assembly of a draft German constitution to be ratified or rejected in a free national referendum. To these proposals, the Bonn Government added four conditions which it considered as prerequisites for the conduct of free elections. Public reaction to the Bonn offer was generally favorable in West Germany, but as expected, the response of the Soviet zone government was to reject the Adenauer proposals.

On May 25, 1950, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Commandant in Berlin, delivered a letter on behalf of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany to Gen. V. I. Chuikov, Soviet Commandant for Berlin, on the question of German unity and all-German elections.<sup>3</sup> The letter referred to the

discussion of German unity by the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States at their London meeting and attached the text of their conclusions on German unification and the manner in which it might be accomplished. The letter also made reference to the public communiqué released by the three Western Foreign Ministers on May 14 which stated that the Western Powers did not contemplate the conclusion of a separate peace treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, in particular because such a move would involve continued partition of Germany—a concept with which the Western Powers did not wish to associate themselves.

The letter to Chuikov further called attention to paragraph I of the March 22 declaration of the Federal Republic suggesting that the four occupation powers should assume the responsibility for framing an electoral law under which all-German elections might be conducted. The U.S. Government, the letter indicated, was prepared to engage in conversations on the High Commission level for the purpose of framing such an electoral law, pointing toward the formation of an all-German Government "in conformity with the principles set forth in the attached statement of the Foreign Ministers."

No reply was ever made to this letter.

Addressing the Bundestag of the Federal Republic on September 14, 1950, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer condemned the elections to be held in the Soviet zone of Germany on October 15 and referred again to the Federal Republic's March 22 proposals for holding all-German elections along democratic lines. Immediately following Adenauer's speech, the Bundestag passed a resolution calling upon the Federal Government to make a formal request to the occupation powers to arrange in their zones of occupation for the holding of "free, universal, secret, and direct elections to an all-German parliament, under international control, and in which everyone will have an equal vote."

In accordance with the resolution of the Bundestag, the Federal Chancellor addressed separate letters to the four Commissioners on October 1, noting with satisfaction that the four Governments taking part in the occupation of Germany had repeatedly expressed their willingness to strive toward the goal of the restoration of the political and governmental unity of Germany.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of June 5, 1950, p. 885.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 884.



Adenauer stated that "the first and indispensable step to achieve this end is the convocation of a constituent German national assembly," and suggested the following measures to achieve this end:

(1) All-German elections to a national constituent assembly shall be announced following enactment of an electoral law by the four occupying powers.

(2) Elections to the national constituent assembly shall in all parts of Germany take place under the supervision of commissions composed of representatives of the four occupying powers or of representatives of the U. N.

(3) The sole task of the national constituent assembly shall be the drafting of a German constitution. This draft constitution shall be submitted to the German people for approval.

In addition to the measures cited, the letter set forth certain guarantees of personal and political freedom of movement and activity as prerequisite for the holding of all-German elections.

After consultation, the U.S., U.K., and French High Commissioners dispatched separate communications dated October 9 to General Chuikov referring to their as yet unanswered letters of May 25 and enclosing copies of the Adenauer letter of October 1, the Bundestag resolution of September 14 and the Adenauer statement made in the Bundestag on the same date. The three High Commissioners indicated their endorsement of the Federal Republic as a "government freely elected by the people" and "entitled to speak for Germany" and commended to the attention of Chuikov and the Soviet Government the aforementioned documents as "pronouncements of the German people." In conclusion the three Western Powers indicated that they shared the views of the Federal Republic on the October 15 Soviet zone elections and informed the Soviet Government that it must bear full responsibility for obstructing the accomplishment of the reunification of Germany in accordance with its obligations under Potsdam.

#### Prague Communiqué

The next important development on the unity issue came with the release on October 21 of the Prague communiqué at the conclusion of the meeting of Soviet and satellite Foreign Ministers.<sup>4</sup> In brief, the communiqué referred to the September 19 communiqué issued in New York by the three Western Foreign Ministers and charged that the

chief concern of the New York meeting was "the question of recreating the German Army, the question of the remilitarization of Western Germany." The communiqué also charged that the question of ending the state of war with Germany was being brought up "in order to postpone as long as possible the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and thus the unification of Germany." In conclusion the eastern Foreign Ministers stated that they regarded it as an immediate necessity that—

Firstly, the United States, British, French, and the Soviet Governments should publish a declaration that they will not permit the remilitarization of Germany or its inclusion in any sort of aggressive plans, and that they will determinedly endeavor to see that the Potsdam Agreement regarding the creation of prerequisites for the formation of a united, peace-loving, democratic German state is really carried out;

Secondly, all restrictions that are obstructing the development of peacetime German economy be removed, and the restoration of German war potential not be permitted;

Thirdly, a peace treaty with Germany be forthwith concluded, with a restoration of the unity of the German state in conformity with the Potsdam Agreement, and the occupation troops of all the great powers be withdrawn from Germany within a year of the conclusion of the peace treaty;

Fourthly, an all-German constituent council be formed from representatives of Eastern and Western Germany on the principle of parity, for the purpose of preparing the formation of provisional, democratic, peace-loving, all-German sovereign government, this council to submit the proper proposals for common approval by the Governments of the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great Britain, and France, and, until such time as an all-German Government is formed, to be included in discussions on the working out of a peace treaty. With regard to this proposal, the German people may, under given circumstances, be consulted directly.

On their side, the Governments of the U.S.S.R., Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Roumania, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic will do everything possible to facilitate the solution of the immediate tasks in the interest of consolidating peace and international security.

The Prague meeting, convened for the announced purpose of discussing "the remilitarization of West Germany," followed closely on the heels of the delivery on October 19 of a Soviet note rejecting the protest made by the three Western Powers the preceding May against the existence in the Soviet zone of paramilitary police. In their reply, the Soviets charged that the Western Powers themselves were engaged in establishing a German army and concluded by stating that "the U.S.S.R. will not tolerate such measures."

<sup>4</sup> For Secretary Acheson's comment on the Prague communiqué, see BULLETIN of Nov. 6, 1950, p. 727.

As a logical follow-up to the Prague conference, the Soviets delivered notes to the U.S., U.K., and French Governments on November 3, enclosing copies of the Prague communiqué and calling for a four-power meeting to discuss the demilitarization provisions of the Potsdam Agreement. The Western Allied reply and the Soviet note of December 31 then followed.<sup>5</sup>

#### **The Grotewohl-Adenauer Exchange**

Meanwhile, on December 1, Otto Grotewohl, Minister-President of the "German Democratic Republic," had a letter delivered to Chancellor Adenauer at Bonn. Referring to the "national emergency brought about by the division of Germany, which is accentuated by the remilitarization and inclusion of West Germany in plans for preparation for war" and citing the need for a German solution to the German problem, Grotewohl proposed the formation of an all-German constituent council with participation on the basis of parity of representatives of East and West Germany. This council would prepare the formation of an "all-German, sovereign, democratic and peace-loving provisional government" and would submit proposals to the Governments of the U.S.S.R., U.S., Great Britain, and France for common ratification. At the same time it would consult with the named governments until the formation of an all-German government on the draft of a peace treaty. Grotewohl further suggested that a plebiscite of the German people on this proposal could be carried out.

On January 15, 1951, Chancellor Adenauer replied to the Grotewohl letter by issuing a public statement. In brief, Adenauer referred to the March 22, 1950, declaration of the Federal Republic which contained proposals for the achievement of German unity under conditions of freedom, pointed to the failure of the Soviets to respond to the Bundestag proposals for German unification forwarded to Chuikov on October 9, 1950, and stated clearly that the West German Government could enter into talks on German unity "only with those who are prepared to recognize and guarantee without reserve a constitutional order, a free form of government, protection of civil rights and preservation of freedom."

The Communist propaganda campaign on unity was continued when on January 30, 1951, the

People's Chamber of the East German Government passed a resolution addressed to the West German Bundestag, in which it indicated its willingness to conduct negotiations "concerning all questions connected with the creation and tasks of the all-German Constituent Council."

The Federal Republic issued a statement on the same date indignantly rejecting the right claimed by the East German parliament to speak "in the name of true democracy and of the whole German people." It further called upon the German people "not to allow themselves to be confused by actions of the kind contrived by the Soviet zone Government."

Having decided that it would not reply directly to the People's Chamber appeal, the Bundestag on March 9 passed a resolution which referred to "the contemplated conference of the four occupation powers" and called upon the Federal Government to submit to the Four Powers a petition for the preparation and execution of free, all-German elections. On the same date the Bundestag approved the text of a note addressed by Chancellor Adenauer to the Allied High Commission which echoed the Bundestag resolution, calling upon the Four Powers to arrange for all-German elections as soon as possible and emphasizing that genuinely free elections could only be held if "the indispensable freedoms" were guaranteed in the Soviet zone.

In a speech before the People's Chamber on March 14, 1951, East German Premier Grotewohl rejected the Federal Republic's proposals for free, all-German elections and accused Adenauer of ignoring the will of the German people.

#### **Washington Foreign Ministers Conference**

The next major development in East-West exchanges on the unity question resulted from the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States which was held in Washington from September 10 through September 15, 1951. At the conclusion of this conference, the three Ministers issued a communiqué<sup>6</sup> in which they "noted with satisfaction the results already achieved by their three countries, together with the other free nations of the world, in order to insure their common security and to safeguard the peace." In addition, they indicated that they had agreed upon instruc-

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1951, p. 11.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1951, p. 486.

tions to Allied High Commission for Germany for the negotiation of mutually acceptable agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany, the effect of which will be to transform that relationship completely. In this connection they also referred to their hope that current negotiations with the Federal Republic would result in Allied-German agreement on a German contribution to Western defense.

Reacting quickly, East German Premier Grotewohl denounced the Western communiqué at a special session of the People's Chamber on September 15 as "a gross deception of the German people" which should not be allowed to succeed. Reflecting obvious Communist concern over the results of the Washington conference, Grotewohl declared: "What San Francisco achieved for Japan, Washington is to accomplish for Germany."

On September 27 Chancellor Adenauer replied indirectly to the Grotewohl People's Chamber proposals in a speech before the Bundestag in which he stated that "the supreme aim of the policy of the Federal Government is and remains that of re-establishing German unity in a free and united Europe. This unity should be based on the free decision of the entire German people." Adenauer then referred to the repeated proposals of the Federal Government for free, general, equal, secret, and direct elections for a constituent national assembly and cited the rejection of these proposals by the Soviet zone authorities and failure of the Soviets to reply to any of these proposals. He then declared that the Bonn Government would submit an election procedure for all-German elections which would in its essential points embody safeguards to insure all the necessary freedoms. These points were then spelled out in detail by Adenauer.

He indicated that it was the position of the Federal Republic that really free elections were possible only if the prerequisites for the free expression of the will of the people are fulfilled in fact in the Soviet zone, and called for the creation of a "neutral international commission under the supervision of the United Nations" to examine, in the Soviet zone and in the territory of the Federal Republic, "in how far existing circumstances permit of free elections taking place."

The Adenauer statement was adopted by the Bundestag by an overwhelming majority, together with a motion by the opposition Social

Democratic Party (SPD) calling upon the Federal Government to forward to the four occupying powers a request "to provide the German people with the earliest opportunity to conduct free, general, equal, secret and direct elections under international control" for a constituent assembly. Another SPD motion called for free elections in Berlin.

On October 4, in accordance with the Bundestag resolutions, Chancellor Adenauer addressed a letter to the Tripartite Allied High Commission, requesting the governments of the four occupation powers to arrange for all-German elections. In this connection, Adenauer called upon the powers represented in the Allied High Commission to propose the establishment by the U.N. of a commission to carry out investigations in the Soviet zone and in the Federal Republic to ascertain to what extent prevailing circumstances permit the holding of free elections.

The Allied High Commission replied to the Adenauer letter on October 15 assuring him that the three Governments would, at the first suitable opportunity, place the views of the Federal Republic before the United Nations and would propose that the United Nations undertake an investigation over the whole area of Germany as suggested in the Adenauer letter.<sup>7</sup> In fulfillment of this pledge, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France presented a resolution at the sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the appointment of "an impartial international commission to carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet zone of Germany in order to determine whether existing conditions will make it possible to hold genuinely free elections throughout these areas." This resolution, which was adopted on December 20, 1951, by the overwhelming vote of 50 to 6, resulted in the appointment of a commission composed of representatives of Brazil, Iceland, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Poland.<sup>8</sup> The Polish Government declined to designate a representative.

Following its constitution, the Commission held its first meeting on February 11, 1952, at Paris. On February 23 from its permanent headquarters at Geneva it addressed communications<sup>9</sup> to the Chairman of the Council of the Allied High Com-

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1951, p. 694.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1019; Jan. 14, 1952, p. 55.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, March 3, 1952, p. 350.



mission for Germany for transmittal to the authorities of the Federal Republic and to the authorities of West Berlin, and to the Soviet Control Commission for transmittal to the authorities of the Soviet zone of Germany and the authorities of East Berlin. Both the Western Allied and German authorities in West Germany and Berlin responded promptly, assuring the Commission of their complete cooperation in facilitating the task assigned to it, and subsequently welcomed the Commission's members at Bonn and Berlin. In sharp contrast to this reaction, neither the Soviets nor the East German authorities have responded to three requests on the part of the Commission for permission to enter the Soviet zone of Germany and the Soviet sector of Berlin. Moreover, through their various propaganda mouthpieces—both human and journalistic—the Soviets and their East German puppets have so far rejected

the Commission and sought to malign its members. It remains to be seen whether the Soviets will revise their attitude toward the Commission and permit it to fulfill its important mission which is so crucial to future progress toward the realization of German unity.

**EDITOR'S NOTE:** On March 10, 1952, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko handed to Elim O'Shaughnessy, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow, a note containing proposals for a treaty of peace with Germany. Identical notes were handed to the British and French Ambassadors at Moscow. On March 25, the U.S., British, and French Embassies at Moscow delivered identical notes of reply to the Soviet Government. For texts of these notes and for a statement by Secretary Acheson, see *BULLETIN* of Apr. 7, 1952, p. 530.

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## Observance of Third Anniversary of the Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty

### CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES

[Released to the press April 4]

*Secretary Acheson has sent the following messages to Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, and to Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty:*

#### Message to Chairman of the North Atlantic Council

On this third anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, I wish to extend to you, as Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, the sincere greetings of the Government and people of the United States. Today, it is increasingly evident that our hopes for a peaceful and secure future depend largely upon the success achieved by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The last 3 years have been years of gratifying progress. We have made solid advances toward our goal of an effective mutual defense system, and have seen increasing cooperation among the NATO countries in many fields of activity. This progress has been the product of the effort, sacrifice, and determination of all NATO partners. With each of us contributing these same qualities in the fullest measure, there can be no doubt that we will continue to move forward steadily.

Permit me to add my personal appreciation of the contribution which your leadership has made to our success during recent months.

#### Message to Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

I want to extend my heartiest congratulations to you on assuming the position of Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. To the people of the United States, NATO is a living symbol of our deepest aspirations for peace, freedom, security, and international friendship. We are all comforted by the knowledge that the grave burdens of leadership in this organization will rest upon such capable shoulders. Under your guidance and inspiration, we can look forward confidently to a continued growth in the unity, maturity and strength of the Atlantic community.

### PURPOSE OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

#### Address by the President<sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press by the White House April 4]

When 12 nations of Europe and North America came together 3 years ago to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, one purpose was foremost in our minds. That purpose was to preserve peace for ourselves and our children.

In the 3 years since April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic community has grown steadily in strength and in unity. Two more nations—Greece and Turkey—have joined the original twelve. But

<sup>1</sup> The President's address and those of Secretary Acheson and Mutual Security Director Harriman, which follow, were made at the ceremonies in commemoration of the third anniversary of the signing of NATO, Constitution Hall, Washington, D. C., on Apr. 4.

our purpose is exactly the same as it was 3 years ago.

The North Atlantic Treaty is an instrument of peace. All the lies and smears of hostile propaganda cannot conceal the fact that our nations have entered this treaty to preserve peace. The people of our countries don't want to fight another war; they want to prevent one. And they have gone about it in the only way that can possibly work: that is, by banding together for mutual self-protection.

In the past, many of the North Atlantic Treaty countries, at one time or another, have tried to find peace through neutrality and isolation. It didn't work. It never will work.

The people of the North Atlantic community know that if we are to preserve our independence, we must join our strength together.

We have come a long way in these 3 years. We have created a common defense organization and have begun to develop sizeable defense forces, trained and equipped to spring into action against aggression. If we continue the hard, sustained effort we have begun, we can clearly foresee the time when our common military defenses will be strong enough to defend us against any attack.

But we of the North Atlantic community are doing far more than simply building military defenses. We are also working together to build the solid social and economic foundations which are essential to our military defenses and to our entire future.

It is not our aim to turn the North Atlantic community into one huge garrison, concerned only with defense. Such an objective would be foolish and self-defeating. Our actual aim is far different. Our aim is to remove the threat of war and thus set free the forces of human progress and advancement. We want to get rid of poverty, to wipe out ill-health and disease, to provide better educations for all our people, to build finer cities and towns and improve conditions on farms. We want to open the way to spiritual and religious growth, and the continued development of the arts and sciences.

The North Atlantic Treaty has made a tremendous difference in the outlook of the people of our countries—especially in Europe. Three years ago, many people were very discouraged—they thought the next war was bound to come soon, nothing could be done about it, and successful defense was hopeless.

Today, there is a vast difference. Most people can now see that we are steadily increasing our chances of preventing another world war. And they can see that if we succeed, a great new future will open up for the human mind and spirit.

There are enormous possibilities of applying modern scientific advances to satisfy the needs and desires of men. There are immense opportunities to improve our social institutions, to bring about better living conditions, to achieve the free society men dream of.

The basic principles of the treaty are the same principles that underlie the United Nations: on the one hand, to prevent war, and on the other hand, to improve the conditions of life for men, women, and children everywhere. This is why the North Atlantic Treaty means so much to free men—not only in our own countries, but in other lands.

The struggle for peace is not easy, and it is not a struggle that can be won overnight. We shall have to continue to work for peace with all the determination and skill that we have. Every one of our countries has already accepted heavy burdens in this common struggle for peace, and there will be more burdens and sacrifices in the future.

But we can attain our goal. We are demonstrating in the North Atlantic community every day that the dangers and problems of the modern world can be successfully overcome by men of good will working together in mutual trust and confidence. And that is the way to peace with freedom and justice for all men everywhere.

#### AN ACHIEVEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

*Address by Secretary Acheson*

*[Released to the press April 4]*

Today, we celebrate together the anniversary of an institution which is an achievement of democratic society in our day. Three years ago—on April 4, 1949—representatives of 12 countries of western Europe and North America signed the North Atlantic Treaty here in Washington.

Today, we again have with us representatives of all these countries. And on this anniversary, we are joined by representatives of Greece and Turkey—the two countries which only a few weeks ago were welcomed into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

We welcome to this ceremony young men from the armies, navies, and air forces of our NATO allies, who are now in this country to receive special training.

We welcome officials of the military agencies of NATO, officials of various agencies of the United States Government, and many outstanding members of the Congress of the United States, including Senator Connally, who, together with Senator Vandenberg, played a great part in the creation of this organization.

We not only commemorate the birth of NATO but mark the progress it has made from its inception. The extent of this progress is set forth in the recent report of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

When our 12 countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty 3 years ago, our major immediate purpose was to protect ourselves against armed attack and the threat of it. But the roots of the treaty go deeper than the providing of defense. They go to the values which we are defending—

to the common bonds of liberty, of religious freedom, of economic development, of military interdependence, and of political faith which have always united the free peoples of Europe to those of North America. And its promise for the future is the prospect of common work in many fields to gain a better life for all our peoples.

Today, the creation of defensive strength is still our most urgent task. Danger is still with us. There is not yet enough strength in the North Atlantic area to assure the maintenance of peace. The hopes of our peoples for peace, security, and prosperity demand greater strength for defense—and demand it without delay.

We are meeting this demand. During the past 2 years, our armies have grown. They will continue to grow. They are being trained and equipped. They are being organized effectively. This is not something which we hope to do or plan to do—it is something we are doing *now*.

At the same time, we all realize that the hardest part of the task lies ahead. Each of the 14 countries represented here today has played an important part in the progress we have already made. The full contribution of each will continue to be essential. NATO defense can be created only if each partner shoulders its full share of the common burden.

The burden is not light. During the past 3 years, the peoples of all our countries have made heavy sacrifices in order to give their agreed contribution. In many cases, the efforts made have approached closely the limits of their economic and physical capacities.

This is a problem which all of us have constantly in mind. The threat to our security is so great that none of us can afford to do too little. Yet, we also know that there would be little value in building armies unless we can preserve the economic foundations which support these armies and the society as a whole.

I am convinced that we can solve these problems, however difficult they may be. I am convinced that together we can attain both military strength and economic stability. This group of nations cannot be free and secure unless they have both. By exerting our utmost efforts to help ourselves and help one another, we *can* have both. Together, our countries have enough manpower, resources, skills, and faith to master the problem of transforming the necessary portion of our potential strength into strength in being.

As we do so, let us remember that we are constructing something more permanent than military formations. In a common enterprise of this kind, it is often true that there are consequences of our work together which will be more enduring than its immediate purpose. As we learn to work together to make ourselves strong, we are also learning to *think* together and to *live* together.

Already, one result of our efforts has taken form and substance. The nations of continental Europe have begun to develop unified political, economic,

and military institutions. When completed, these institutions can underpin the strength of Europe for generations to come. These countries have attacked the barriers to trade which in the past have limited the efficient use of their skills and resources. They have taken steps to add to the productivity of labor and to make sure that the labor force can be used to the best possible advantage. Some of them have developed arrangements for pooling vital raw materials such as coal and steel, and are working out plans for merging their military forces.

In all these undertakings, ancient national rivalries are being subordinated to the common determination of these peoples to maintain their freedom. The primary credit for these decisive steps toward unity must go to Europe's own statesmen and peoples. We may take pride that NATO has greatly encouraged and assisted this process.

Meanwhile, NATO itself has become a living and growing institution. Even while we are forced to concentrate on the problems of defense, we study possibilities of greater cooperation in the political, economic, and cultural fields. We have turned our eyes to the future—to the day when the peace and security we seek shall open a new era of human progress.

April 4, 1949, began a great experiment in international cooperation. It is an experiment in unity for strength, for peace, and for progress. The unity comes from ancient bonds which have long drawn us together.

May these bonds grow ever more firm and strong, for they will sustain an Atlantic community which shall be a source of strength to the United Nations and to all free peoples—to all peoples everywhere who wish to live in peace.

## NEW CONCEPT OF NATO

*by W. Averell Harriman*

*Director for Mutual Security*

*[Released to the press by Mutual Security Agency April 4]*

Not the least remarkable thing about this anniversary we celebrate today is that it is only the third. It seems scarcely possible that the North Atlantic Treaty was signed only 3 years ago. The first meeting of the NATO Council took place only 2½ years ago. It was only 1 year ago that General Eisenhower assumed his command. Yet in so short a time, NATO has become one of the most powerful facts of international life. It is the foundation of the structure of security the free nations are building around the world.

We are participating in a new development in the history of nations. There have been other alliances in the past; in fact, there is another now. The Soviet Union has forced its satellites into an involuntary alliance held together by force and fear. This is the old system of domination and dictatorship.



NATO is the new concept. Twelve European countries with Canada and the United States have voluntarily come together as free and equal partners, eager to work out common solutions to common problems. It may be harder to find agreement among equal nations than it is to dictate agreement from the Kremlin, but the agreements we make will be strong and enduring, because they are the voluntary agreements of free men determined to preserve their freedom.

In the preservation of this freedom, our most pressing problem is to build a firm defense against aggression. It is to accomplish this that most of our energies are now bent. That job is not yet completed, but already, in 3 years, we see clearly that it can be done. We can look forward with confidence to the time when the free world is strong enough in arms to make aggression impractical. When that time comes, we can devote more of our energies to strengthening the world in other ways. It is then, as the Secretary of State has suggested, that NATO may serve as an instrument for the fulfillment of the great aspirations of mankind.

But in the meantime, our immediate task remains with us—to make ourselves secure. Just as no individual can find security unless his nation is secure, no free nation can find security unless the free world is secure. The NATO partners have joined their resources in building collective strength—not on the basis of narrow nationalism, but on the basis of an effective division of labor among partners, with each country contributing to a balanced, collective force.

The NATO idea is based upon the principle of mutual effort. It can be successful only if each nation does its part. The United States, as the strongest of the partners, is called upon to make the greatest contribution to the mutual security. This contribution would be useless if it were not matched by vigorous efforts on the part of other countries. The extraordinary progress that NATO has made is a demonstration that all partners are doing their part.

The United States gives strength to NATO. In turn we gain strength from it. This is the meaning of mutual security—the great modern answer to the age-old problem of how nations can preserve peace. It is on this principle that 14 nations have bound themselves together in NATO. It is on this principle that the United States has embarked upon a great world-wide program of mutual security.

The danger is world-wide and so is our response. The danger takes many forms. So does our effort to gain security. We have not accepted the fallacy that the only threat is a military one. The threat of communism does not come only from the sword. The threat of communism is strong where men are weak—weakened from hunger, injustice, or ignorance. We must build security by helping

people strengthen themselves in other than military ways. We know that the only world in which we can be secure is a world in which men are strong, healthy, and free.

This is the philosophy behind all our joint efforts in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Through NATO, we are working for the common defense against aggression. Through NATO, we are working for economic expansion and the prosperity of all our peoples. Through NATO, we are working to foster freedom. Through NATO, we are seeking to release the intellectual and spiritual forces which are our common heritage.

In joining together for these purposes, the nations of the North Atlantic community have had to shake off the weight of the historic prejudices which we all carry. We have had to develop new patterns of thought.

This is as true of the United States as it is of the other NATO partners. Perhaps it is even more true of us, for the United States has been singularly protected by its history and geography. When we were projected into a position of world leadership, there were those who questioned our ability to change our traditional outlook. But who today, reflecting on the history of the last few years, can doubt the capacity of the American people to play the role in which we have been cast? Who, today, reflecting upon the initiative shown in Europe, can doubt the capacity of the peoples of all the NATO countries to rise to the challenge?

The greatest single asset of the North Atlantic community is its human resources. Together we number some 400 million of the most creative and enlightened people in the world with by far the largest part of the world's industrial production. With all these resources, why should we live in fear? We need not live in fear. Another world war is not inevitable. Let no man say it is.

It is true that there are difficult tasks ahead. Let us not delude ourselves that because we have accomplished much in 3 years we may now relax our efforts.

The whole process of building mutual security is at a critical phase in all its aspects. Courageous political decisions must be made. Total production must continue to expand. The military buildup must go ahead rapidly. If any of us who are joined in this great endeavor slackens his efforts now, we will undermine what we have built. This is a critical moment in history when the future of mankind will be determined by the steadfastness, the vigor, and the speed with which we all press forward.

In our own lifetime we have seen the terrible results of hesitation. There is no time for hesitation now. The progress of the last 3 years shows what can be done when like-minded nations work together. Together, this great assembly of free men can surely obtain our common objectives of security and the opportunity for human progress.

## First Anniversary of SHAPE as an Operational Headquarters

*Report of General Dwight D. Eisenhower  
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe*<sup>1</sup>

One year ago today, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe [SHAPE], assumed operational control of the forces dedicated to the defense of Western Europe. From that day onward, every member of this headquarters has been dedicated personally to the cause of peace and security.

This anniversary provides a vantage point to review progress during the initial year of our joint enterprise, to take stock of our needs, and to present to member nations certain views that have developed in my Headquarters concerning our present security position. Though these observations reach beyond the purely geographical limits of this command, we have found that no turbulence in the world scene fails to react directly on our common enterprise in Europe. The struggle against the threat of dictatorial aggression has no geographical bounds; it is all one.

It would be disastrous if the favorable signs and developments recorded in this report were to put any mind at ease, or to create a sense of adequate security, for there is no real security yet achieved in Europe; there is only a beginning.

Equally, it would be unfortunate if anyone were to find excuse for defeatism in the manifold difficulties and shortcomings of our joint effort to date. For we have made progress in all aspects of security. The momentum must be continued with renewed vigor, and since moral force is the genesis of all progress, especially progress toward security and peace, we must give primary attention to this vital element.

We are competing with an ideological force, communism, which has joined with the imperialistic ambitions of a group controlling all life and resources found between the Elbe and China Sea. Throughout this vast region, unity is achieved by the simple techniques of the police state. In this concert of action and power lies great danger for any single nation exposed directly or indirectly to the unrelenting never ending attacks of propaganda, subversion, force, and the threat of force.

<sup>1</sup> Released to the press by SHAPE, Public Information Division, Paris, France, on Apr. 2. The report is made to the Chairman of the Standing Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

If the free nations are to remain secure, our peoples must march together, agreed on common goals, and win that cooperative unity possible only in a free society.

We want peace, we want freedom, too, and the individual rights to which our whole civilization is dedicated, but to want these things is not enough, we can keep them only by work, selflessness, constancy, and sacrifice. The enormity of the present threat will never be met by half-hearted measures or by any superficial military facade. Required is the full awakening of the free world and the pursuit of energetic, far reaching measures to insure our form of life, even our survival.

During the first 50 years of this century, the nations of the Atlantic community have spent their strength and heritage in great conflicts which began in Europe and spread over much of the world's surface. As in all wars, a costly number of the natural leaders were killed. Destruction was widespread; public treasuries were emptied and family savings wiped out through inflation; economic conditions inflicted such heavy punishment on the masses of citizens that social problems took on new and bitter prominence; in important areas of Africa and Asia, confidence in Western leadership was shaken.

As we look over these developments, it seems almost as if the nations of the West have been, for decades, blindly enacting parts in a drama that could have been written by Lenin, prophet of militant Communistic expansion. This pattern of events, which points so surely to ultimate disaster, can be changed if only the peoples of the West have the wisdom to make a complete break with many things of the past and show a willingness to do something new and challenging. NATO itself is a significant step to meet both the present danger of aggression and the tragic struggles and dissensions that have divided our peoples in the past, but NATO's development is not automatic: action is the test.

To advance this great effort, unified action is required, not only among but within our nations. Yet, it has seemed more than once within our countries that political factions hold their own immediate gain higher than the fate of their na-

tion or even that of civilization itself. Then there are elements striving to hold back the hands of the clock, and apparently placing profits above patriotism. At the same time, there are workers in our member countries still suffering the delusion that their interests are served by association with Communist-led labor groups. It is nightmarish that any free worker of the West could respond voluntarily to the same Kremlin voices that have dictated the elimination of free labor unions in Russia and satellite countries. In the free system, labor is a full-fledged partner and must share in responsibility as equally as it must share in productivity. We can thrive mightily in an era of good feeling. It can be brought into being by vibrant, selfless leadership at all levels of society.

The unity of NATO must rest ultimately on one thing—the enlightened self-interest of each participating nation. The United States, for example, is furnishing much of the material resources of this project during the current year because it believes that America's enlightened self-interest is served thereby; most American people agree as to the wisdom and necessity of this course. But they will continue to believe their own security interests are being served only as other participants show cooperation and enterprise in improving their own defenses. Consequently, it would be fatuous for anyone to assume that the taxpayers of America will continue to pour money and resources into Europe unless encouraged by steady progress toward mutual cooperation and full effectiveness. To be sure, the citizens of all NATO countries are carrying heavy tax burdens, but even if these are at optimum levels, there still are many steps possible in Europe which would cost little and yet bring rich returns through increased strength.

Fundamentally, and on a long-term basis, each important geographical area must be defended primarily by the people of that region. The average citizen must, therefore, feel that he has a vital stake in the fight for freedom, not that he is a bystander of a pawn in a struggle for power. There is so much talk of national and international arrangements and interests that basic issues are often obscured from view. Fundamentally, we are fighting the battle of individual freedom for all. Before all men and before the world, our policies must be such as to inspire confidence in our strength and determination, and trust in our fairness. This is the moral foundation without which any military effort, any expenditure in lives and treasure, is fruitless.

By our actions, too, we must demonstrate in convincing form that we are masters of our own destiny. Within the Atlantic community and in Europe, we have the opportunity to build a bulwark of peace—a central position of unity and strength for the free world. This, then, must be a first and fundamental consideration.

## THE SITUATION ONE YEAR AGO

[Excerpts]

From all information presented, it was clear that the difficulties facing the new enterprise were manifold. Problems and the doubt they bred were on every side. It is common knowledge that peacetime coalitions throughout history have been weak and notoriously inefficient. Sovereign nations have always found it difficult to discover common ground on which they could stand together for any length of time. Nevertheless, we were expecting NATO members not only to agree on common objectives but to work and sacrifice together, over an indefinite period, in order to achieve common security.

## THE MILITARY PROBLEM

[Excerpts]

To all these problems we now had to turn our minds. On the one hand, there was the problem of how to persuade the nations of the free West to allocate afresh their resources in production and manpower, so as to build between themselves and the East the required shield. On the other hand, was the strategic organization of the huge region, stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea, which the forces of the West must defend. It is with the latter problem that I shall deal first.

Western Europe, from North Cape to Sicily, had to be surveyed as a whole. There is the main land mass, stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic—a peninsula, when viewed in perspective, of that greatest of all land masses, which is Europe and Asia combined. On the flanks of this long peninsula we have two main outcrops—apart from the Iberian Peninsula and the British Isles. The one is Denmark, almost touching the tip of Scandinavia, whose western half, Norway, is among our brotherhood of nations sworn to defend freedom. The southern outcrop is Italy, projecting into the Mediterranean, and affording us a strong position for flanking forces with valuable air and sea bases.

We therefore conceived of Western Europe as an ultimate stronghold flanked by two defended regions: One comprising Denmark and Norway, and the other comprising Italy. All three of these countries are blessed by certain dispensations in the way of natural defensive advantages. Norway has its rugged coast and hinterland; Denmark, its many internal water obstacles; Italy, her mountains with the narrow passes on the north and the Adriatic to the East. It seemed sound to divide the command of Western Europe into three main sectors; Norway and Denmark as the one buttress, Italy and adjacent waters as the other, and the central mass as the main structure.



Along these lines, the SHAPE command structure was fashioned. The bulk of ground and air strength would of necessity be in the center and a smaller number of land and air forces, together with naval support, would defend the northern and southern flanks. Accordingly, in the spring of 1951, there was announced the formation of a Northern Allied Command under Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, with Maj. Gen. Robert Taylor as his Air Commander, Lt. Gen. Wilhelm Hansteen, commanding Allied Land Forces, Norway, and Lt. Gen. Ebbe Gortz (later Lt. Gen. Erik Moller) commanding Allied Land Forces, Denmark.

In the center, Gen. Alphonse P. Juin was chosen to command Land Forces, with Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad in command of Air Forces. To insure the coordination of naval units operating in support of the center, Vice Admiral Robert Jaujard was appointed Flag Officer, Central Europe. These officers had the responsible duty of forging into single and redoubtable weapons the forces of the national contingents unified under their commands. There were to be units from France, Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The air forces of the center were to be so developed and placed that they could operate with the central land forces and also be able to undertake any needed action on the flanks with the least possible delay.

At the time of activation of the central headquarters the organization for the command of the southern flank was still not designated. Our immediate need was the protection of this flank with land and air forces and an effective naval force, including carrier based aircraft. This need was intertwined with the problems of defense in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, which made for complexities that would take time to solve.

The solution to the military problem was no more than begun with the development of the command structure and the various headquarters. The big task of "forging the weapons" remained—that is, the recruiting, training, and equipping of the standing forces and reserves, and of providing their support in the war of airfields, signal communications, and supply lines. All these necessary elements in men and equipment, the North Atlantic Treaty nations were called upon to contribute to the common defense.

#### **POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS**

[Excerpts]

Everywhere we turned we ran into political and economic factors. One thing was clear—nothing would be gained and much lost through any substantial lowering of the already low standard of living in Europe. Our central problem was one of morale—the spirit of man. All human progress in the military or other fields has its source

in the heart. No man will fight unless he feels he has something worth fighting for. Next, then, is the factor of the strength of the supporting economy. Unless the economy can safely carry the military establishment, whatever force of this nature a nation might create is worse than useless in a crisis. Since behind it there is nothing, it will only disintegrate.

In the general rehabilitation of European economy, the Marshall Plan had achieved remarkable success in the years 1947–50. The measure of its contribution to the well-being and stability of Europe could be fully appreciated only by one who had seen the situation there before and after. Nevertheless, the starting point had been so close to rock bottom that only a minimum level of economic strength had been regained.

The Soviets, who wanted no recovery in Western Europe, had screamed that the Marshall Plan was a war measure, even though its terms offered economic assistance to the U.S.S.R. and its satellites on the same basis as that accepted by the free nations. In concept and application, the program was political and economic—to repair the chaos of war, to start industry on the road to health, and to raise production to a level consistent with minimum civil needs.

To assist free nations, in Europe, and elsewhere, to build their own defenses against the persistent threat of aggression, the United States inaugurated the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) late in 1949. The purpose of this program was to furnish items of military equipment which the other countries could not produce, and to assist in the training required for the effective use of those weapons. In the European area, the program also provided the countries some of the machine tools, materials and various components needed to get the production of munitions started.

The flow of materials to Europe was under way during 1951, consisting for the most part of tanks, vehicles, aircraft, and guns from existing stocks. A number of light naval vessels of combat and support types were also transferred to European navies.

For their part, recipient nations were to raise and maintain the forces and furnish the balance of equipment they needed. In addition, they were to prepare to cope with maintenance and replacement programs of the heavy equipment at the earliest practicable date. The United Kingdom, with her greater industrial capacity, was in the best position to furnish the bulk of her own needs in tanks, aircraft and communications equipment.

Despite this extensive aid, the rearmament program meant heavy budget increases in all European countries. Larger permanent establishments were required, and more extensive training programs. Facilities had to be created for new forces—airfields, depots, and all the requirements peculiar to military forces. Of these needs, airfields were by far the most critical and expensive

category. For the 1952 airfield program then being planned, real estate and construction costs amounted to the equivalent of one-half billion dollars.

The effect of defense spending on national economics was greatly magnified by sharp world-wide increases in the cost of raw materials. Food, coal, and other basic necessities soared to new heights, kindling antagonism against governmental defense programs and the whole rearmament effort. In the village where I live not far from Paris, ordinary laborers averaged the equivalent of \$70 a month; yet coal for their cook stoves ranged up to \$50 a ton. For the price of a pair of shoes, the average man in Italy was already working 8 times as long as the American worker; for a pound of butter the French worker toiled 5 times as long as his American counterpart.

It is recognized, of course, that such comparisons reflect many factors, including resources, management, tools, and efficiency. Nevertheless, they show that, heavy as defense costs were to the American taxpayer, far lesser burdens could be felt seriously by the average European. Understandably, European governments were inclined to move carefully in such a political climate. As a consequence, all recommendations for augmenting forces, building airfields, or increasing budget items were closely examined and frequently subject to lengthy negotiation within the various parliamentary factions.

However, the concerted effort toward greater strength made progress throughout the spring and summer months. The attitude of the governments was cooperative, but there did exist a general feeling that an accurate yardstick was needed within NATO to measure the scale and intensity of national effort. Obviously, this was an extremely complicated problem in view of the differences in national resources, financial position, industrial potential, and standards of living of various nations. Yet, failure to meet the situation would eventually lead to dissatisfaction and friction among our membership.

There were other problems as well. Our planning estimates of SHAPE forces to be created over the next few years had been prepared largely from the standpoint of military requirements. These programs now needed a feasibility test to insure that they were within the economic capabilities of member countries. However, no one knew the price tags. Presumably, some program would in time be evolved to coordinate NATO-wide production. But aside from the equipment pledged by the United States, no country knew at the moment what weapons it should plan on making for itself, what specialties it might make for other Allied nations, or what it should procure from others.

Concern was felt in many quarters over the apparent failure to put to full use existing production facilities of Europe. There had always been large munitions industries in France and

Belgium; the Netherlands possessed unused capacity in the electrical and other technical fields; several large aircraft factories were idle in Italy. The Defense Production Board of NATO had made extensive surveys of European production capabilities and had verified that considerable additional military production was possible. Nevertheless, financial limitations and the lack of firm national programs prolonged this distressing waste of facilities.

Recognition of the specific problems impeding progress led to the appointment of the Temporary Council Committee at the NATO meeting in Ottawa during September of 1951. Headed by W. Averell Harriman of the United States, this committee served NATO as an advisory group but, nevertheless, had power to investigate the broad military effort and the potential of each of the member nations.

The primary task of the Tcc was to develop a plan of action reconciling the issues arising from an acceptable military program with the actual capabilities of the member countries. It also considered ways and means of reducing the cost of building effective defensive forces. In the process, the Committee surveyed the political and economic capabilities of each NATO country, as well as problems requiring attention in order to develop these capabilities.

The efforts of the Tcc represent a monumental achievement—an achievement which could only have been accomplished with the thoroughgoing cooperation of the member nations. SHAPE was a principal beneficiary of its labors. The operation of the Committee was truly an innovation in that sovereign nations permitted an international group to examine their defense programs and their capacity—financial, economic, and military—of supporting heavier burdens.

As a result, the true dimensions of the rearmament task could be seen for the first time in terms of an integrated military, economic, and financial effort. For the first time, positive recommendations could be made for a more efficient pooling of production facilities and for a more equitable sharing of the burdens incident to the defense program. The recommendations of the Tcc were detailed and far going. They were not all acceptable to the governments of the participating nations, but in large part they were. The final report of the Tcc was approved at Lisbon and represented one of the great advances made at that meeting.

## A NEW SOURCE OF STRENGTH

[Excerpts]

Even with the maximum potential realized through the collective efforts of member nations, there is little hope for the economical long-term attainment of security and stability in Europe

unless Western Germany can be counted on the side of the free nations. Here in the heart of Europe is an area of roughly 100,000 square miles, populated by nearly 50,000,000 industrious and highly skilled people. Rich in natural resources and production facilities, Western Germany alone produces one-half as much steel annually as the rest of Western Europe combined. The coal of the Ruhr, along with the industrial sinews it feeds, is a prime economic fact in Europe.

With Western Germany in our orbit, NATO forces would form a strong and unbroken line in central Europe from the Baltic to the Alps. Depth is always a desirable element in defense; in the restricted area of Western Europe it is mandatory. Defensive depth is indispensable in countering the striking power of mechanized armies, and the speed and range of modern aircraft.

At first glance, a military alliance between Germany and the European nations of NATO would seem to lose sight of history. Too recently has Germany been the destroyer of peace in the Western world. The thought of a rearmed Germany is a matter of grave concern to the nations of Western Europe, who have suffered much from the misuse of German power. Certainly, their anxiety is understandable.

However, the people of Western Germany have made substantial progress toward understanding and achieving self-government. This development should be further encouraged by bringing them into closer association with the freedoms of the West. Thus their contributions to the common defense must be made on the one possible basis, a voluntary one with equality of treatment for all.

Surely, it would be foolhardy to assume that a great country like Germany could long remain a vacuum. Unless Germany becomes a partner of the West, we might, eventually, see a repetition of the disaster of Czechoslovakia. Consider the glittering blandishments held out to the Germans by Moscow during recent months—promises of German unity, renewal of her old trade with Eastern Europe, a German national army, removal of occupation forces and restrictions. The sturdy determination of the German Federal Republic to ally itself with the freedoms of the West has been manifested by its refusal to be blinded by such tactics. For the good of the German people, this is certainly the only course. For them the choice is starkly clear—freedom or subjection.

As presently conceived, the European Defense Force calls for the pooling of forces into a common military organization for the defense of all. Initially, the forces to be unified would be those allocated by the participating nations to the defense of Europe. Troops required to meet commitments outside of Europe proper would be retained under national control. The direction, support, and administration of the unified defense

forces would be vested in a European Defense Community, including a European assembly, a council, a court of justice, and an executive group, along with agencies for military supply, procurement, and budget. Such integration of military forces, and particularly the integration of their supply and supporting agencies, would prevent any participating nation from embarking on a separate course of aggression.

The European Defense Force would include land, air, and naval units, and their supporting elements. Basic ground units would be called "groupements," of about 12,000 men. The air would be organized into wing-size units. At this level, troops would not be mixed as to nationality, thus preserving the language, customs, and *esprit* of the home peoples. These basic units would be combined in larger military formations such as army corps, made up of elements of different national origin. The practicality of such integration was proved many times during the last war and is currently being demonstrated by our United Nations troops in Korea.

When formed, the European Defense Force would be integrated under SHAPE in the same manner as purely national forces from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other countries not members of the European Defense Community. The new grouping would not modify, conflict with, or in any way supersede the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The concept of a European Defense Force is the consolidation of military elements of five nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with forces from still another nation, Western Germany. It cannot fail to increase greatly the effectiveness of our collective security and to facilitate the achievement of NATO aims.

Success would be a long step also toward the unification of Europe. This is the central goal and the only possible way of creating reasonable security, and insuring at the same time, the improvement in living standards that characterizes Western civilization. Therein lies the real answer to the threat of Communistic inundation. It is not enough to know that our combined resources outweigh those of the Soviet dictators. What matters is our ability to use them in the best possible way for our security and well-being.

Such efficiency demands the closest kind of political and economic cooperation, particularly in the area of Western Europe. For if the free nations of this region were really a unit, tremendous benefits would accrue to them individually and to NATO. Few Europeans would quarrel with this concept: political and economic unity is a popular theme to millions who have suffered from past differences. Yet progress toward full cooperation has been limited by the intricate and artificial maze of national obstacles erected by man himself.

The advantages of political and economic unity can be demonstrated by such practical examples



as the European Defense Force and the Schuman Plan, which embrace the same six countries. The Schuman Plan calls for the pooling and production of steel and coal—vital commodities of life and defense.

In my opinion the two plans, the Schuman Plan and the European Defense Community, mark historic advances in European cooperation. If these could be supplemented by a Schuman Plan for electric power and for agriculture, along with a system for standardizing money values, the benefits would be profound and far reaching. These joint efforts would serve as practical laboratories for the development of that full political and economic unity which alone can make Europe self-sustaining and secure. Indeed, until this hope becomes an accomplished fact, or some miracle brings about a disappearance of the Soviet threat, there will be no confident peace and enlarging prosperity for any part of the free world.

Although it is my conviction that a unified Europe offers the best hope for permanent stability in this critical area, respectable strength can nevertheless be achieved within NATO by wholehearted effort and cooperation. Much has been done toward that end in the past 12 months. Viewed separately, as military, economic, and political achievements, these gains may not be spectacular; but taken as a whole, they have created a profound change in morale, the basic factor of all.

Already our active forces have increased to a point where they could give a vigorous account of themselves, should an attack be launched against us. In terms of army divisions, whether in service or quickly mobilizable, our forces in Western Europe have nearly doubled in numbers. The national units pledged to this command a year ago were for the most part poorly equipped, inadequately trained, and lacking essential support in both supplies and installations. Because of their weakness on all fronts, and the absence of central direction, they could have offered little more than token resistance to attack. Today, the combat readiness of our troops has improved markedly. Readjustments in their deployment have enhanced their potential effectiveness against the threat from the East. Behind them is a steadily expanding supply system, and a command organization to plan and direct their coordinated efforts. Still disappointingly far from sufficient for a determined defense, they nevertheless represent a fighting force in whose spirit and increasing fitness our nations can take considerable pride.

Pursuant to the recommendations of the Temporary Council Committee, our member countries have pledged to produce this year 50 divisions for European defense, exclusive of those to be provided by the two new NATO nations, Greece and Turkey. Roughly one-half of the 50 divisions will be standing forces; the remainder are planned as reserve divisions available for employment at periods varying from 3 to 30 days.

The number of divisions pledged does not fully represent the magnitude of the effort required from the various member nations. Along with the divisions furnished, each nation must produce a variety of combat and service support elements, such as engineers, heavy artillery, communications and transport, supply and maintenance units, to maintain these divisions in the field. When combined with other needs such as antiaircraft defenses, these requirements raise manpower and equipment totals to twice or three times those represented within the combat divisions.

The building of these priority reserve divisions and similar forces to follow them represents one of the most difficult and urgent problems now before us. Each nation must now organize its reservists so as to produce trained formations which will be fit to fight without a long period of training after mobilization. Air power is the dominant factor in war today. It cannot win a war alone, but without it no war can be won.

Our air arm has gradually progressed in strength and effectiveness during the past year. But the development of air power is a long and complex process.

There is still a long way to go in developing air strength in Western Europe. A major task has been and continues to be the provision of adequate air bases and communications to link them. A vast amount of new construction is needed to accommodate the air power necessary to the defense of the West.

One of the most heartening achievements of the Lisbon conference was the approval by member nations of a cost-sharing scheme to build a large number of additional airfields in Europe.

As presently scheduled, NATO's European air arm will include by the end of 1952 some 4,000 operational aircraft, a significant proportion of which will be modern jet fighters. When realized, this air strength will amount to a greatly improved situation over what we faced a year ago, but it will still be far from our ultimate requirements.

The naval equation in Western European waters is still weighted strongly in our favor. Deficiencies exist in minesweepers, antisubmarine craft, and harbor defense installations, but efforts are being made toward filling these needs. The main advance on the naval side has been realized in the excellent coordination and common procedures evolved by Allied navies in European waters.

These developments will bring to all European defense problems—sea, air, and land—the effective application of modern sea power and the wide range of weapons which its arsenal contains. This capability is of particular importance in the northern and southern regions of my command. With the extension of the southern defense area some 1,400 miles eastward a broad flanking position will be organized under Admiral Carney, combining SHAPE forces in Italy and the Central

Mediterranean with those of Greece and Turkey. The essential role of sea power here is to link and support the defense forces of these countries while working in close cooperation with other Allied forces in the Mediterranean area.

Recently I have had the stimulating experience of visiting our two new NATO members, Greece and Turkey. Knowing the courage they have shown in the face of direct Communist pressure, we are proud at SHAPE to welcome them as allies.

The growth of military strength reported during the past year has derived from various sources. Certainly it could not have been achieved without the arrival in the increasing numbers of tanks, aircraft, and heavy equipment from the United States and Canada. But arms are useless without trained manpower; and during the past 18 months every Western European nation represented in SHAPE has increased the length of its conscription period. Defense budgets were also raised; and among these continental members, military expenditures now average over twice the pre-Korean level.

Extensive field exercises, with air forces and ground troops representing eight nations, took place in Western Germany last fall. Naval exercises and operations have been conducted by Allied fleets in the Mediterranean, the Channel, and northern waters. With soldiers, sailors, and airmen from many nations working together, the sense of comradeship, unity and common destiny has been strengthened. The merging of diverse procedures and many tongues is not an easy task; but techniques have been designed to overcome the difficulties, and Allied commanders have been able not only to test them, but also to practice with valuable results the handling of international forces.

At this time, the forces assigned to SHAPE are not of themselves sufficient to stay the hand of an aggressor. Of some comfort in this bleak realization is the existence of other military forces of the NATO countries in adjacent areas.

Military strength is of little worth unless backed by healthy, expanding economies. In this truth is found the source of many of our bitterest problems. Yet, from the very beginning of our endeavor, we have been able to draw some confidence from the knowledge that NATO's economic potential is superior to that of the East. This potential springs from the productive peoples of the Atlantic community who hold in their grasp the greatest economic production, the most advanced technology the world has yet seen.

The process of channeling economic output into military ends, though rarely easy, has seemed particularly hard in the present circumstances. Scarcity in Europe has been prolonged and severe. To deny even a part of the increased production to civil demands has been difficult; to make such decisions effective has been burdensome. The changes in established patterns of consumption

and distribution, of trade and income, brought on by expanded military requirements, have encountered resistance of many kinds. Governmental decisions in this part of the world must be made in an atmosphere of extreme financial stringency and under heavy pressure from various groups who feel acutely the impact of new taxes, controls, and higher prices.

Increasing defense budgets have posed real problems of fiscal and financial management. Hanging over the NATO defense effort has been the menace of inflation, which if unchecked, could wipe out all gains. The picture is by no means bright, and we are far from being able to regard the success of the military budgetary programs as already assured. In some countries, the pressure of inflation has been effectively checked. In others, inflation is surging upward and endangering the whole defense program.

From relatively small beginnings, European production of the equipment and supplies for modern armies, navies, and air forces has increased during the past year and further increases will be undertaken. A significant and growing proportion of the military equipment being provided by the United States to its NATO partners is soon to be produced in European factories.

After necessary initial armaments have been produced, Europe must become self-sustaining in military manufactures at the earliest possible date. The United States is currently making a tremendous effort to furnish a great portion of the capital outlay in military equipment. Without this, there could be no effective forces on the Continent within the next 4 or 5 years. But America cannot continue to be the primary source of munitions for the entire free world. To do so would be militarily unsound. Moreover, the United States cannot long continue such expenditures without endangering her own economic structure. The soundness of that structure is of vital concern to the entire free world, for its collapse would be a world shaking tragedy.

There is no precedent in peacetime for the NATO concept. At SHAPE, the basic relationships and the sweep of interest of a peacetime international command have evolved from day to day. I can state accurately that a great many of the problems referred to me, and often the most difficult have been economic, political, and psychological rather than purely military. But even in the military field we have seen considerable change in the specific responsibilities and activities of this command.

The military forces we are building must be continually modified to keep pace with new weapons. To this end an annual review of the full nature and composition of our military programs should be accomplished.

Our goals are simple; they are honorable; they can be achieved. Why, therefore, should there be confusion in the minds of millions of our own

peoples as to the basic aims of our defense program, the necessity for it, and the urgent demand for their own individual efforts?

Once these facts are established in the minds of our Atlantic peoples, there will be less bickering in our councils, and it will become progressively more difficult for self-seeking individuals to delay our progress by exploiting internal national divisions or minor grievances between our members. Once the truth is understood, once the critical dangers present in the world situation are really known, there will be less complacency concerning our present military situation, and the harmful effects of delay will be clearly seen.

The Soviet Army casts its shadow over the length and breadth of Europe. The satellite countries have increased the size and combat effectiveness of their armed forces. Reports from behind the Iron Curtain indicate that the restiveness of these captive people has led to even tighter, tougher, more brutal measures of state control. The familiar technique of the purge, deliberate terror, and intimidation has forced a measure of unity—however unhappy—in this area.

The Soviet Air Force in Eastern Germany is currently replacing obsolescent aircraft with jet planes. Work on airfields, communications, and supply installations is being vigorously pursued in Eastern Europe. By the prolongation of the war in Korea and Indochina, by the constant attempts at erosion and subversion of effective government in the Far East and Middle East, heavy drains have been imposed upon the Western Powers, which reduce the resources available to establish a balance in Europe.

Nevertheless, the tide has begun to flow our way and the situation of the free world is brighter than it was a year ago. At Lisbon, our member nations made great headway on issues vital to our continued progress. They strengthened our eastern flank by bringing into NATO the stout-hearted peoples of Greece and Turkey. They agreed to the concept of a European Defense Community and a close relationship with the German Federal Republic. They approved a program to establish this year a force of 50 standing and reserve divisions and 4,000 aircraft.

When combined with the ready strength available in Greece and Turkey, this force—if properly armed and trained—should produce an encourag-

ing degree of security. Considering training, organization, matériel, vital installations, and all the various factors which go to make up military proficiency, I personally would look upon completion of this program as clear material evidence that the basic goals of our combined enterprise are going to be achieved.

Now our governments must convert the Lisbon program into actuality. It demands full and unstinting support, for only through positive action by all our nations can we ever achieve tranquility and security.

As we work together in the coming year, we are carrying out our pledge to each other. We are reaffirming our true beliefs in the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. We are one in our desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. But we are steadfast in our determination to safeguard the freedom, the common heritage, and the civilization of our member nations.

This is a great task—a noble charge. In a world where powerful forces are working tirelessly to destroy the freedom, individual liberty, and dignity of man, we cannot for one moment delay our advance toward security. The task will require constant watchfulness, hard work, cooperation, and sacrifice, but what we do now can grant us peace for generations.

It can be done, given the will to do it. There is power in our union—and resourcefulness on land, sea, and air. Visible and within grasp we have the capability of building such military, economic, and moral strength as the Communist world would never dare to challenge.

When that point is reached, the Iron Curtain rulers may finally be willing to participate seriously in disarmament negotiations. Then, we may see fulfilled the universal hope expressed in the United Nations Charter to reduce the “diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources.” Then the Atlantic community will have proved worthy of its history and its God-given endowments. We shall have proved our union the world’s most potent influence toward peace among men—the final security goal of humanity.

2 APRIL 1952

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER



## Visit of Queen Juliana of the Netherlands

### STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press April 2]

I want to take advantage of this opportunity to express the happiness of all Americans that Her Majesty The Queen of The Netherlands, His Royal Highness The Prince of The Netherlands, His Excellency The Foreign Minister, and the other members of Her Majesty's party will arrive in Washington in a few hours. This visit will further enhance the true friendship which exists between the Netherlands and this country. Everyone looks forward to making their tour of the United States a most happy and memorable time.

All of us are much aware of Dutch contributions to this country, to its growth, to its culture, to its material development. I doubt that there is a telephone directory for any major city in the United States in which there is less than a full page of names beginning with "van." The Netherlands Government was one of the first Governments to lend this country financial aid after the American Revolution. In these days when it has become necessary for the free world to stand closer together than ever before we appreciate this early instance of investment in freedom.

### ADDRESS BY QUEEN JULIANA TO THE CONGRESS<sup>1</sup>

I am grateful to be invited to speak to you—as once my mother did—to you, the elected Representatives of the American people, and I do so, first of all, because of the gratitude my husband and I and all of the Netherlands people feel for the wonderful welcome given to us by your country, which calls itself rightfully the land of the free and the home of the brave, in this its very sanctuary.

We feel we appear here in the name of a nation of your comrades in the recent war—that crusade against evil—in which each performed his particular part. A brotherhood was born there in the depth of distress and in the height of joy. The Dutch people hold in deep respect and grateful memory your brave men, who sacrificed their lives wherever we have been fighting side by side.

<sup>1</sup> Made on Apr. 3, and printed from *Cong. Rec.* of the same date, p. 3500.

Before you came to our aid we already had a comradeship, consisting of a close kinship of descent and of a similarity in our national history and growth as independent and democratic nations. We even also seem to share some of our virtues and vices. But, nevertheless, there is still always need to deepen our understanding for each other. Because it is this we need more than anything else, as contact among mankind is growing ever closer, we have never before been so keenly aware that in this world of ours we need cooperation as intimate as that among the cells of one body.

You have seen this, and have planned a program for aid to the countries robbed and ruined by totalitarian war—help on such a scale as has never been conceived before. We in the Netherlands were deeply impressed by your great plans and their execution. They enable us to stand once more on our own feet. We shall do so as soon as possible in ever sounder economic circumstances.

On this occasion again, and in this Hall especially, I want to express the thanks of the Netherlands for this proof of generous friendship, offered by your Government and by your people through the voice of Congress and by countless private voices. The call for transoceanic friendship then became very strong.

If America does not want to stand alone—and I know she does not—I feel that she not only likes to give her help to others but that she also counts on their support. The Netherlands can give you that support, in your eyes perhaps a small amount in the form of goods or money, but much in the form of good will.

That is not the indebted feeling of the beneficiary, or the feeling of the debtor toward the creditor; it is not the feeling of the small toward the great, or the feeling of the planned-for toward the planner; but the feeling of friendship and relationship of the free for the free, of those who can carry responsibility for those who can carry it, too, and of mutual respect for each other and for all, sprung from that general and very deep-rooted sense for the connection, brotherhood, and coexistence of all mankind.

One human race, under the law and the love of one God.

Our human legislations seek from afar to follow the divine law. They mostly fail, but they strive on.

We live in the dawn of a time when we must seek to do this as one human race.

Mankind should be one kind.

A split humanity is like a split personality; it is inclined to go from bad to worse, unless it recovers its unity of purpose, comes to coordinated thinking, and gains sanity and happiness.

The sane part of the mind of humanity must always remember it is responsible for the other part. The sound half is the one which is designated to save the other half.

The American people have entrusted you with the honor and the grave mandate of working out your great country's role in this important era.

I see any task of being a servant to the public interest, being one myself, as one of the finest, but also as the most difficult and responsible. You, as representatives of the people, carry this great responsibility both toward your voters and toward the general well-being of your country, and consequently, especially in our modern interwoven conditions, toward the world at large.

This places on each of you the full burden of a responsibility nobody will envy you, as your decisions have enormous repercussions all through the world.

It is my personal wish for you that each of you may experience individually the gratifying feeling of satisfaction that your decisions will have proved in the end to be essentially and ultimately the right ones.

I do not want to be so short-sighted as to ask you to bear in mind the interests of the Netherlands in particular, or even those of Europe. What I want to plead for, though, are the interests of the world as a whole.

With you, I realize keenly how any apparently trifling interest may represent a great principle and, on the other hand, how a necessary sacrifice in the local sphere may mean greater well-being for the greater community, to the ultimate good even of those who made the sacrifice.

Let me assure you that the Dutch people will accept, for a common cause, the full share of their burden.

We have been so fortunate as to live in social peace and stability, and so we feel we can be a reliable pillar of European unity, a unity which is growing by means of the Schuman plan, other economic and defensive and—perhaps eventually—political integration. Constitutional amendments have been voted lately by the Netherlands Parliament, in order to remove some remaining obstacles to our partnership in future supranational organizations.

#### **The Growing Unity of Europe**

There is a growing strength in this growing unity of free and democratic Europe, necessary for the very strength of the world.

Only such a vision can lead to that greater unity which the world yearns for.

April 14, 1952

Only a great vision will some day find the way out of the universal fear of war and annihilation.

Many of us believe we are in a downward spin. How can the trend downward become the trend upward?

I think that the challenge of our time is to start a definite upward trend to a higher unity and well-being than we ever reached before. Judging from the results of all our endeavors, however, the right answer is still to be found.

I am not referring to idealism here. I am referring to practical solutions.

Most likely they will mean some sacrifices for us all. If we all could only really train our minds—and may I also say: Wake up our hearts—to this idea of sacrifice. Not only our financial, our economic and our political interests—worse, our sovereignty and prestige are involved in all this. We may succeed in working out plans for coordination which will at least make a closer cooperation possible between those countries which are aware of the overriding interest of integration. We still seem far away from this Utopia and yet it remains hard to understand why we do not achieve greater results with the magnificent tools with which modern science has equipped us and with the many superior minds which we have in our midst. If we could only use the tools properly and place the best minds in the most difficult posts we might be able to achieve results which would demonstrate that the sacrifices which were made in reality proved to be blessings in disguise.

I am not thinking of any particular form of coordination or organization. There are brilliant minds in abundance, to seek and find the right one.

The United Nations is still in its infancy and although it is encouragingly successful in some fields, it has to cope with the greatest difficulties. Yet, who would question the value of a world organization as the most essential form we need to serve this development?

But there is no avoiding the fact that the world is split into two parts, that there are two magnetic poles of which one is positive—the one called democracy—and the other is negative, indicating slavery. To my mind there is no doubt that if we could only increase the energy radiated by the positive pole of freedom and democracy, it would be impossible for the negative pole to withstand this force and it would in the end have to yield. All the doubting spirits in the world, in our western countries, in the old and young democracies, in the newly sovereign states on other continents, must be enabled to see clearly that only the free and democratic world can give them all which is considered worth while.

#### **The U.S. Technical Assistance Program**

That is why I must express a deep appreciation here for the far-sighted American policy concerning a project like the technical-assistance program.

Through this program the technically more advanced countries can extend assistance in a completely unbiased and unconditional manner to the overpopulated and technically less advanced areas in the world, which stand in urgent need of the skill and know-how of the western nations.

Our material resources in the Netherlands are not large enough to send important supplies or give financial assistance to underprivileged areas. We can and do participate in the export of skills, the sending of technical experts, which will show these countries how to help themselves. For students and scholars who wish to further develop their abilities in Europe we have founded the Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation with an Institute of Social Studies, which provides courses in a series of subjects of particular importance to foreign students.

It is my earnest hope that one memorable day the enormous increase of production now demanded by rearmament will be converted to meet the demands of these enormous development projects.

The circle of countries around the North Atlantic Ocean should avoid imitating the example set by the countries behind the iron curtain, which have focused their minds so much on their defense that they forget to focus as much attention on their economic, social, and cultural well-being, let alone the progress of the whole family of nations.

If they do neglect these aspects, someday they might find themselves isolated around their ocean before, for instance, technical assistance could get under way properly and link them with the world at large.

This one might call a cold war for peace.

The public-minded spirit of service to the world at large originates in the United States of America if anywhere.

If this spirit gets its chance, it will lead to good will among nations and men and good will leads to understanding and understanding leads to confidence. And confidence is the only workable basis for international cooperation. Without confidence it has no base, no efficiency, no success. It is a sheer waste of time and money, paper and ink, and, worse, of hope.

#### **A Pax Atlantica**

If it gets its chance, it will grow into a pax Atlantica—Atlantic peace.

I do not think that in a Pax Atlantica the Atlantic community could ever become an isolated group. Much less could it ever be a threat to other parts of the world, for even as an Atlantic community we cannot permit ourselves to withdraw in splendid isolation and give up our links with the rest of the world community.

The stones of the Atlantic structure which we

are building together are cemented by our affinity for one another, for otherwise they might easily fall apart once more.

It is true that a sea connects, but only when people want it so.

The uninhabited space of the water by nature separates.

For what purpose are we pulling together but to save freedom, the Atlantic freedoms?

Freedom is not only the absence of tyranny in whatever form; it is life itself. Life is the positive pole, as opposed to the negative one, which is slavery and death.

To accept freedom means to carry responsibility. Wherever this is recognized as a right and a duty for everybody, we call it democracy. It is the only form of fair government. In no other regime is human dignity respected so absolutely and an equal opportunity given to everybody regardless of his convictions. Democracies will naturally be inclined to be peaceful, as they represent the people. These principles were laid down in a matchless way in your Declaration of Independence. All these things are what we, as democratic peoples, have in common. This is our unity.

We all want the Atlantic peace to pioneer the peace of the world.

We cannot hope for better times unless mankind as a whole throws off its shackles—shackles of every kind—not only those of tyranny and totalitarianism but also those of self-interest, prejudice, lack of understanding, and lack of confidence.

It stands to reason that when those are abolished humanity might radiate the well-being of freedom, justice, and security, and might make a start for a better world and a full communal life.

Mankind in its distress has to trust largely to your good judgment for its deliverance.

Let us all do the best we can. Leave the rest to God. He will not forsake this poor world for the sake of all the good-willing and bravely striving souls living in it.

#### **CORRECTION**

In the BULLETIN of April 7, page 536, the second column should begin:

"down to provincial levels and making use of Indian art, literature, films, dance, music, and education is indicated in plans for the All-India Cultural Conference and Festival for Peace to be held in Calcutta, April 2 to 6."

In the same issue, page 549, first column, the sentence beginning in line 9 should read: "The primary purpose of the booklet is to draw the interest of potential candidates toward the Foreign Service."



## Aims of "American Peace Crusade" Exposed

*Statement by Francis H. Russell*

*Director of the Office of Public Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

The Department of State notes the statements which this delegation of the "American peace crusade" have just made and those which have been received in the past few days from other members. Your group urges (1) "a recognition of the right of colonial people to independence and self-government," (2) "an end to the rearming of the German Nazis," and (3) "peace in Korea immediately."

First of all, although you have not referred to it in your statements, it should be made plain that your organization is a counterpart in the United States of a world-wide Communist campaign which receives its direction from the Kremlin.

Not only is your "peace crusade" Communist directed, it also follows the standard Communist tactic of seeking to increase Communist power through public confusion. It is part of an effort to cover up the Communist goal of world domination by drawing over itself a cover of spurious ideals which simulate those to which honest and well-intentioned people subscribe.

In this connection it is useful to recall Stalin's words that if any foreign minister begins to defend "peace" to the death "you can be sure his government has already placed its order for new dreadnoughts and airplanes. A diplomat's words must have no relation to action—otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for the concealment of bad deeds."

You say that you want "a recognition of the right of colonial people to independence and self-government." Within the last 12 years the countries of the free world have given independence and self-government to 600 millions of people. This includes the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Burma, Libya, and Ceylon, and others are attaining their independence as rapidly as the conditions necessary for self-government are created. The policies which have resulted in this unprecedented series of steps toward popular independence still underlie the actions of the free world.

During approximately the same period the Soviet Union has deprived of their independence and liberties the peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia,

East Germany, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The peoples of China are also suffering the horrors of Communist methods of control. These people total over 550 million.

This record speaks for itself.

You say that you desire "an end to the rearming of the German Nazis". In the parts of Germany that have been occupied by the American, British, and French Governments nazism has been supplanted by a genuinely democratic political system. The Government of Western Germany has indicated no intention of rebuilding German militarism. It has on the contrary indicated its intention of contributing to the European armed forces which will make secure the freedom and the independence of the peace-minded peoples of Europe. This is the best possible guarantee against any form of totalitarian aggression, Nazi or Communist.

At the same time, the Soviet Union in its note of March 10 has proposed to allow Germany a national army and to grant amnesty to Nazis.

You urge "peace in Korea immediately". From the time Korea was first liberated from the Japanese the efforts of this Government have been directed toward bringing about as quickly as possible a free, independent, and peaceful Korea. These efforts have been rendered ineffective by the refusal of the Kremlin to cooperate with the United Nations in accomplishing these objectives and by the Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea. The peace in Korea was broken by Communist aggression. It could be restored if there were any honest willingness on the part of the Communists to restore it.

The group to which you belong is a tool of communism and does not represent any significant element of the American people. It can be said with confidence that your effort to confuse the people of the free world is futile. The growing solidarity of the free world has been demonstrated at San Francisco, in the various meetings of the United Nations, in the progress of NATO and the European Defense Community, in the Organization of American States, and in the growing determination of free peoples everywhere to defend themselves against aggression. The free world is making progress in the only way in which progress is possible toward the goals which you falsely claim as your objectives.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the delegation of the American Peace Crusade at the Department of State on Apr. 1 and released to the press on the same date.

## Tenth Anniversary of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs

### STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

*[Released to the press by the White House March 31]*

Today, March 31, 1952, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs celebrates its tenth anniversary.

Its 10 years of life have been 10 years of international cooperation in improving the living standards of the people of this hemisphere.

The climate of peace and prosperity among the American Republics is a great source of comfort and pride to us all. A real share of the credit for this achievement is due to the Institute of Inter-American Affairs.

The program of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs is one of the world's best examples of mutual effort by democratic nations to solve their most pressing economic and social problems. No other overseas government program better fulfills the historic good neighbor policy of the United States. The experience of the Institute shows us how technical assistance can be made available on a cooperative basis not only in the Western Hemisphere but also in other parts of the world under the Point Four concept.

The Institute undertakes its constructive work only at the invitation and with the participation of the countries concerned. Two-way cooperation is the reason for the Institute's success. Through the Institute our country works with the other American Republics as self-respecting nations, on an independent but cooperative basis.

Over the past decade, the Institute's cooperative programs have touched directly or indirectly the lives of millions of people in Latin America on the farms, in the small towns, and in the big cities. Malaria and other dread diseases are being conquered. The capital of a leading Latin American country for the first time now has a safe system of water supply and sewage. Another nation is diversifying its basic agriculture in the first major program to change an uneconomic one-crop pattern established centuries ago.

In the Andes region, industrial safety experts provided by the Institute are serving as advisers on safety methods in mining. In the vast Amazon River Valley, health centers established with the help of the Institute and staffed by doctors, nurses, and laboratory technicians are wiping out diseases and providing preventive medical services

for jungle dwellers who never before had medical attention.

These and other technical-assistance projects are a notable contribution to the unity of the hemisphere and to its common determination to prove that the way of freedom is better than the way of communism.

There is still a great deal to do. In one of the leading Latin American nations, for example, productivity is only one-eighth of what it is in the United States, life expectancy is only 40 years, compared to about 68 for the United States; and scarcely one out of three children in rural areas can go to school. The need for further work is evident. The activities of the Institute must continue so that we can expand our efforts to fight hunger, poverty, disease, and illiteracy throughout the American Republics.

### STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

*[Released to the press March 31]*

We in the Department take great pride in the activities of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) which, on March 31, 1952, will celebrate 10 years of technical cooperation with Latin America in the improvement on a hemispheric basis of food production, public health, and basic and vocational education. I take pleasure in adding my congratulations to those of thousands of other Americans throughout both continents.

As regional administrative office in Latin America for all Technical Cooperation Administration Point Four activities, the Institute is playing an important role in the attainment of mutual security. Today, it is carrying on programs of cooperation with 19 republics in Latin America. Its pioneer experience is being utilized in Point Four technical-assistance projects in many other areas of the free world.

As the operating and expediting agency in Latin America of President Truman's Point Four policy of technical assistance to friendly nations, the Institute has made a large contribution toward the atmosphere of friendship and security prevailing in this hemisphere. Its support of the good neighbor policy during the past 10 years has helped build the hemisphere into a neighborhood of self-respecting, self-reliant friends.

Historically, the Institute is a logical outgrowth of the basic aspects of our foreign policy. It has strengthened the already strong ties of respect and unity binding us together in the determination to reach goals of better living and economic advancement. It has helped contribute to the defense of the free world against aggression.

Defense can never be assured by military action or preparedness alone. To assist in building a strong economy among free and friendly people is a major objective of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. In this effort, the countries of this hemisphere—both large and small—played their part.

Fortunately, we have real friends and allies in this hemisphere. They stood by our side in World War II, and they are increasing their important contributions of strategic materials in the present emergency. This contribution is made possible by the very projects to which the United States is contributing technical assistance through the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. This assistance is not confined to the Institute's cooperative programs of agriculture, education, health and sanitation, and public services. It includes, under the expanded program of the Technical Cooperation Administration, the coordination by the Institute, as the Point Four regional office for Latin America, of the work of 44 other United States agencies in many other sound economic activities.

Five hundred Americans are now working with more than 9,000 local technicians in the closest collaboration. They have made progress. They have economic importance to the countries in which they operate and to us. They contribute toward providing us with strong, friendly neighbors and toward improving local economic conditions. These factors join to provide a favorable climate for local and foreign investments and the establishment of a large group of potential purchasers of American manufactured products.

The technical-assistance program in Latin America has been cooperative in every sense of the word. The average matching contributions by the Latin American host nations for carrying on the programs is approximately \$8 to \$1 from the United States. If all ILAA administrative expenses are included, the ratio is better than \$3 to each \$1 from the United States. Throughout the 10 years of the program a chief goal of U.S. technicians has been to train Latin American personnel to assume full responsibility for each project as soon as possible.

This spirit of cooperation toward common goals has been a source of inspiration and encouragement to all. We look forward to the continued contribution of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in the future.

## **Austrian Federal Chancellor To Visit U.S.**

The Department of State on March 31 announced that the American Embassy at Vienna issued the following announcement on March 31 concerning the invitation which has been extended by the Government of the United States to the Federal Chancellor of Austria, Dr. Leopold Figl, to visit the United States:

The Austrian Federal Chancellor has accepted an invitation of the American Government to visit the United States during the month of May. This visit will afford an opportunity for a personal exchange of views on questions of mutual interest between the Governments of Austria and the United States. It will provide occasion also for the American people to demonstrate their friendship and admiration for the Austrian people and their Government, which Chancellor Figl has headed since December 1945.

## **Discussions on Free Territory Of Trieste**

*Statement by Secretary Acheson*

*[Released to the press April 2]*

I should like to inform you that our representatives in the conversations to be held in London within the next few days with representatives of the British and Italian Governments to discuss matters pertaining to the administration of Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste will be Julius C. Holmes, Minister of our Embassy in London, and Joseph N. Greene, Jr., of the Office of Western European Affairs of the Department of State. They will be assisted by officers from the Allied Military Government in Trieste.

Obviously, it is impossible to anticipate the suggestions that will be offered for discussion, or to predict results. As for the purpose of the meeting, I should like to refer you to our announcement of several days ago which stated the desire of the three Governments to reach amongst themselves and with local authorities a closer collaboration in the zone.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On Mar. 27 the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Michael J. McDermott, said that "The United States, United Kingdom, and Italy have decided to examine jointly the arrangements in Zone A of the free territory of Trieste with a view to reaching a closer collaboration in the zone amongst themselves and with the local authorities in the spirit of the friendly relations which unite them in the Atlantic alliance."



## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### U.S. Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure And Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments

U. N. doc. DC/Comm. 2/1  
Dated April 5, 1952

#### INTRODUCTION

The General Assembly resolution calling for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments directs that the Commission be guided by a number of principles, including the following:

(Operative paragraph 3)

"(a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces—including para-military, security and police forces—and all armaments including atomic;

"(b) Such verification must be based on effective international inspection to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed; this inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the international control organ (or organs) to be established."

Operative paragraph 5 of the resolution reads as follows:

"5. *Directs* the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to in paragraph 3 above, to consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of which is recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution".

It is therefore apparent that the General Assembly resolution contemplates that the newly created Disarmament Commission should as a matter of priority deal with the problem of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments.

#### U.S. PROPOSALS

The United States herewith submits for consideration the following working paper on progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments.

##### A. Extent of Disclosure and Verification

1. The system of disclosure and verification must be on a continuing basis. Disclosure as of a particular date on a "one time basis" and subsequent verification of such disclosure would not meet the requirements of a continuing program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces. Therefore it is contemplated that the machinery which will be set up should be on a

permanent or at least a long term basis, since the disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments will be on a continuing basis.

2. The disclosure must cover all armed forces of every kind including para-military, security and police forces and all armaments including atomic.

3. The verification of armed forces and armaments must likewise cover all armed forces of every kind including para-military, security and police forces and all armaments including atomic.

4. The permanent machinery to be established must provide adequate safeguards under a competent international authority having appropriate status, rights and powers.

##### B. Stages of Disclosure and Verification

5. Disclosure and verification must be carried out step by step with appropriate provisions for proceeding to the next step when and only when previous steps have been satisfactorily completed. The reasons for proceeding by stages are two:

(a) In the existing state of international tensions all states must be protected in the event of a serious violation or collapse of the system of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments. The existence of stages gives all states the opportunity over a period of time to test the good faith of all other states. The mere agreement to enter into a system for disclosure and verification would give no assurance that the parties thereto would actually carry it out in full or at all. With disclosure and verification in several stages and with each step of one stage completed prior to the commencement of the next stage, all States have the opportunity at periodic intervals of checking the good faith of other States through review of the information theretofore disclosed.

(b) It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification would proceed from the less secret areas which would be disclosed and verified in early stages to the more secret areas. A phasing of this nature in addition to furnishing the best test of the good faith of all States would cause the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country, since the less sensitive information can in fact be more readily verified, and would, in cases of differences or delays, prevent premature disclosure of information which many States would like reserved until substantial cooperation and good faith has been demonstrated.

6. In considering the appropriate number of stages, the United States had as its objective the full implementation of the program of disclosure and verification as rapidly as feasible in the light of the existing state of international tensions. An excessive number of stages, each of which

must be completed prior to the commencement of the next stage, would unduly delay not only the program of disclosure and verification but also the entire program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments. With this in mind, the United States concluded and is proposing that the number of stages of disclosure and verification should be five—a figure which represents the minimum number consistent with the considerations set forth in the previous paragraph. In each stage, the disclosure and verification processes will go forward simultaneously on a wide variety of items in order to accelerate the successful completion of the program.

7. Annex I sets forth in outline the extent of armed forces and armaments (excluding atomic) to be disclosed in the respective stages and the manner of verification of the information required to be disclosed. Annex II sets forth the same information with respect to atomic armaments. The proposals with respect to atomic weapons are presented in a separate annex solely in the interests of clarity of presentation. Both the problems involved and the appropriate terminology with respect to atomic weapons differ so greatly from the problems and terminology with respect to other weapons that a single annex comprehending both might be confusing. It is contemplated that all stages of disclosure and verification cover both atomic and non-atomic weapons. In other words, the first stage includes the items set forth both in Annex I and in Annex II for disclosure and verification in that stage, and the same is true as to all succeeding stages.

8. Without commenting in detail at this point on the specific items subject to disclosure and verification in the respective stages, it should be noted that the armed forces and armaments to be disclosed in the first stage have three general characteristics:

- (a) They should prove to be the least secret items.
- (b) In the main, they are most susceptible of verification by periodic visits of inspection and through reference to statistical records—with the result that verification can take place with the minimum of interference in the internal life of the respective countries. Some resort would nevertheless be required to "on-the-spot" inspection, and aerial reconnaissance would be required in all stages to assist in checking the adequacy of the disclosure.
- (c) At the same time, these items reveal so vast a segment of the military potential of all States that their disclosure and verification as provided in this stage in and of itself would act as an indication of good faith and would thus greatly facilitate progress towards the ultimate goals of the entire program of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments.

9. The armed forces and armaments to be disclosed in the second, third, fourth and fifth stages are progressively more secret and more difficult to verify except through "on-the-spot" investigations in conjunction with extensive aerial reconnaissance.

10. The character of the items to be disclosed and verified in the five stages as outlined in Annexes I and II can in general be summarized as follows:

- Stage I.** A quantitative count in the nature of a report on existing strength levels of all armed forces and of the location of installations and facilities concerned with armaments of all types including atomic.
- Stage II.** Detailed disclosure of organization of armed forces and of installations and facilities concerned with the basic materials required for production of all armaments including atomic.
- Stage III.** Detailed disclosure of armaments (except novel armaments) fissionable material and installations and facilities utilized in their production.
- Stage IV.** Detailed disclosure of installations and facilities utilized in the production of novel armaments including atomic (armaments not in

general use by the end of the second World War but in volume production today).

**Stage V.** Detailed disclosure of novel armaments including atomic.

11. The information to be disclosed and verified in all stages—and particularly in the early stages—is so vast that there appear to be advantages in disclosing material only at the rate at which it can be processed. Therefore, in general within each stage, disclosure should proceed progressively step by step in accordance with an agreed plan from the less sensitive information to that which is more sensitive.

## C. Inspection

12. The system of disclosure and verification is an integral part of the system of safeguards which must be established to ensure observance of the overall program of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments so as to provide for the prompt detection of violations while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country. It will not be adequate to provide merely for the verification of disclosed information. In addition provision must be made for determining the adequacy of the disclosed information, through broad general powers of "on-the-spot" inspection, through access to statistical data permitting independent confirmation of required reports and through aerial surveys.

13. Extensive aerial reconnaissance is obviously essential to the verification procedure in order completely to determine the adequacy of disclosed information. It will be obvious that aerial reconnaissance furnishes the easiest method of determining the existence of large undisclosed facilities and installations. Aerial survey will be essential in all stages of the disclosure and verification procedure.

14. It is contemplated that "on-the-spot" inspection will take place in all stages as a part of the verification procedure. Its use, however, will be less extensive in the first than in the latter stages because of the greater ease of verification through other methods of the items disclosed in the first stage. It will of course be necessary at each stage to regulate inspection in such a way as to prevent disclosure of information which is to be withheld from disclosure and verification during the particular stage. Certain principles governing limitations on the right of "on-the-spot" inspections in early stages are set forth in Annexes I and II.

15. Each state at the commencement of each stage should submit to the Commission a general description of the nature and location of facilities falling within the terms of reference for that stage. Access to such locations, reasonably sufficient to verify the information disclosed should be granted to inspectors. Inspection in each stage should proceed in accordance with a previously accepted plan.

16. It is essential to an effective system of verification that the international inspectors, in addition to examining declared installations and facilities be permitted in all stages to have access to the entire national territory in order that the Commission may determine within reasonable limits the accuracy and adequacy of the information disclosed. Accordingly, each State should be required during each stage of the process of disclosure and verification to permit the international inspectors such freedom of movement and to give them access to such installations and facilities, records and data as may reasonably be required, including the right to inspect physical dimensions of all facilities and installations wherever situated.

17. Each state should facilitate the activities of the international inspectors and furnish to them such assistance as they may reasonably require.

18. Procedure should be set up in order to permit a determination by the Commission of the necessity for in-

spection of any facilities or installations access to which is denied to the inspectors and where in the judgment of the inspectors such inspection is required.

19. The inspectors should report to the Commission any information indicating a major violation of any provisions of the treaties or agreements respecting disclosure and verification. In the event of a Commission determination confirmed by the Security Council, by the affirmative vote of any seven Members, of such a major violation during any stage and the failure of the state guilty of violation to repair the same within a reasonable specified period, other states should be free to suspend the operations of the disclosure and verification system.

20. The first stage of disclosure and verification should commence upon (a) the entry into force of the treaties dealing with the program of disclosure and verification and referred to in operative paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution, and (b) the establishment pursuant to such treaties of international machinery responsible for carrying out the program of disclosure and verification including the portion of such machinery located within the territory of states adhering to the program.

21. Disclosure and verification in all stages subsequent to the first stage could commence upon a Commission determination that the previous stage has been satisfactorily completed.

#### D. Miscellaneous

22. The United Nations should establish concurrently with and at the time of the adoption of the general principles governing this program the necessary inspection machinery to ensure effective verification of the armed forces and armaments, including those involving atomic energy, disclosed pursuant to the program. In establishing this machinery, consideration should be given to its subsequent utilization to supervise the program for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces. The machinery recommended in the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan would presumably be utilized in connection with the disclosure and verification of armaments involving atomic energy. The problem of appropriate United Nations machinery both for purposes of the system of disclosure and verification and for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments is the subject of a separate study.

23. It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification processes with respect to all adhering states should begin simultaneously and should go forward at approximately the same tempo.

24. The draft treaties or agreements bringing into effect the disclosure and verification system should specifically provide for adherence of states in accordance with the principles set forth in paragraph 5 of the Preamble and paragraph 3 (e) of the General Assembly Resolution of January 11, 1952, the relevant portions of which are as follows:

##### Paragraph 5 of Preamble

"Recognizing that a genuine system for disarmament . . . must be accepted by all nations whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system . . ."

##### Paragraph 3 (e)

"The treaty (or treaties) shall specifically be open to all states for signature and ratification or adherence. The treaty (or treaties) shall provide what states must become parties thereto before the treaty (or treaties) shall enter into force."

#### Annex I

##### *Proposed Stages of Disclosure and Verification, Armed Forces and Non-Atomic Armaments*

#### STAGE I

- Disclose** (a) Over-all manpower strength of regular and reserve military forces and para-military organizations, including training establishments and security and police forces, broken down into each category.  
(b) Location of all operational military installations.
- Verify** (a) By examination and cross-checks of central records to include personnel, disbursement, medical and procurement supplemented by access to and spot checks of records at selected installations.  
(b) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and physical dimensions of installations.  
(a) and (b)—inspectors will have access to entire national territory to extent necessary to determine that all facilities and installations have been declared. Aerial surveys will be permitted for same purpose and to same extent.

#### STAGE II

- Disclose** (a) Organization, composition and disposition of units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stage I.  
(b) Over-all annual capacity of heavy industry relating to armaments to include coal, steel, aluminum and electricity.
- Verify** (a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to personnel, movement of units and administrative support supplemented by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.  
(b) By cross checks of pertinent statistics and employment records, access to plants, and analysis of operation with respect to materials used.  
(a) and (b) by aerial survey as stated in Stage I.

#### STAGE III

- Disclose** (a) Equipment (including reserve equipment of units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stages I and II except units equipped with novel weapons.)  
(b) Production facilities for manufacture of weapons and heavy equipment for units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stages I and II (excluding novel weapons), giving location, type and capacity.
- Verify** (a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to table of organization and equipment, and repair and overhaul of equipment supplemented by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.  
(b) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials, available labor force, and finances, and by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.  
(a) and (b) by aerial survey as stated in Stage I.

#### STAGE IV

- Disclose** (a) Information as to equipment of units equipped with novel weapons to include



biological warfare, chemical warfare, radiological warfare and atomic weapons.

- (b) Installations and facilities devoted to manufacture of novel weapons.

*Verify* (a) By cross checks with Stages I and II and quantitative inspection of units disclosed.

- (b) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials, available labor force, and finances, and by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.

(a) and (b) by aerial survey as set forth in Stage I.

#### STAGE V

*Disclose* (a) Quantities of novel weapons on hand by types.

*Verify* (a) By physical count of stockpiles of finished novel weapons cross checked with information disclosed in Stages I, II, III and IV.

#### Annex II

##### *Proposed Stages of Disclosure and Verification, Atomic Armaments*

#### STAGE I

*Disclose* (a) Location of all installations directly concerned with production of atomic energy, or the product of which is primarily useful in the production of atomic energy. Also manpower employed, physical dimensions, and power input of each installation. (Excluding weapon storage sites.)

- (b) Uses or functions of these installations. This should be confined to a statement giving the input material, the produce material and the process used in each instance.

*Verify* (a) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and physical dimensions of installations. (Inspectors will have access to entire national territory to the extent necessary to determine through such means as aerial survey, inspection of water and railways and power lines, that all atomic energy installations have been declared.)

- (b) Uses and functions insofar as revealed by external examination of all structures and unboxed equipment. Detailed interior inspection shall take place in subsequent stages, the particular stage in which it will take place depending upon the function of the plant. (Verification of (a) above will be of value as partial verification of plant use or function.)

(a) and (b) by aerial survey in all stages for same purposes and to same extent as permitted with armed forces and non-atomic armaments. (See Annex I.)

#### STAGE II

*Disclose* (a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output, of all those installations or parts of installations concerned with preparation of atomic energy raw or feed materials (and such auxiliary materials as graphite, heavy water and beryllium), from mines up to but not including reactors, isotope separation plants, and similar nuclear conversion devices used to produce fissionable or fusionable material.

*Verify* (a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stage I.

#### STAGE III

*Disclose* (a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output of all those atomic energy installations, or parts of installations, concerned with the conversion of feed materials to fissionable or fusionable materials or with the preparation of radioactive materials in large quantities.

- (b) Amounts and types of fissionable or fusionable material on hand or in process; amounts and types of radioisotopes on hand or in process.

- (c) General design and operational characteristics of research laboratories involving reactors operating at a power level of 1 MW or more, including amounts of radioactive, or fissionable or fusionable materials produced.

*Verify* (a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stages I and II.

- (b) By direct and detailed inspection of fissionable or fusionable material, or radioactive materials, installations for production thereof, and appropriate records.

- (c) By survey of facilities associated with reported reactors, by detailed inspection of reactors themselves.

#### STAGE IV

*Disclose* (a) Details of design and operation, including past and present output of all those atomic energy establishments and installations concerned with the fabrication of atomic or radioactive weapons from fissionable or other materials.

*Verify* (a) By direct and detailed inspection of installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stages I, II and III.

#### STAGE V

*Disclose* (a) Location, numbers, and types of atomic and radioactive weapons on hand. Weapon storage sites.

*Verify* (b) By direct inspection. Cross checks with Stages I, II and III and (a) above.

### IMC Allocations

#### *Copper and Zinc*

The Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee of the International Materials Conference on March 26 announced its recommended distribution of copper and zinc for the second quarter of 1952.<sup>1</sup> This is the third consecutive quarter that plans of distribution for these two metals have been agreed to through international cooperation.

The Governments of the 12 countries represented on the Committee have given notice of their acceptance of the plans of distribution. The countries are Australia, Belgium (representing Benelux), Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Peru, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The

<sup>1</sup>For distribution plan, see IMC press release of Mar. 26.

Chilean Government accepted again the Committee's recommendations with respect to 80 percent of the copper production of its large mines. With respect to the remaining 20 percent and the production of its small and medium mines it reserves the right to dispose of this tonnage without reference to the allocation scheme. Notwithstanding this reservation, the Chilean Government restated that it will give careful consideration wherever possible to the Committee's recommendations.

The two distribution plans have also been forwarded to the governments of all countries not represented on the Committee for which allocations are recommended. The needs of nonmember countries were considered along with those of member countries.

Primary copper and zinc (blister and refined copper and slab zinc) are included in the schemes. While semifabricated products have not been allocated, all countries are urged to maintain their export of such semis at a level commensurate with the exporting country's allocation of primary metal, in accordance with normal patterns of trade.

Data submitted by Governments forecast an increase in the availabilities of zinc of approximately 20,000 metric tons in the second quarter of 1952 compared to the first quarter. The amount of zinc being distributed in the second quarter is 510,145 metric tons. The supply of zinc is expected to continue to improve during the second half of 1952 and the situation will be reviewed by the Committee at a later date.

725,000 metric tons of copper have been recommended for distribution in the second quarter compared with 746,180 metric tons in the first quarter. The estimate of production on which the first quarter distribution was based has since had to be revised downward in the light of new information. However, second quarter estimates of production do in fact show an increase over revised first quarter figures. Estimates for the second half of 1952 indicate that the rate of production is increasing, but the amount of copper available to consumers in each of the two following quarters is unlikely to be substantially greater than the tonnage which has been allocated during the second quarter of 1952.

The Committee is not yet in a position to recommend plans of distribution of copper and zinc for any period beyond the second quarter.

As in the fourth quarter of 1951 and the first quarter of 1952, the Committee is not recommending a distribution plan for lead.

As in the first quarter, no allocation has been recommended for strategic stockpiling either of copper or of zinc, without prejudice to the principle of making such provision in future distributions.

In order to conserve supplies of copper and zinc available to the free world, the Committee recommends that all countries do their utmost to elimi-

nate nonessential consumption and to encourage substitution by materials not in short supply.

### *Cobalt-Nickel*

The Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee of the International Materials Conference on March 31 announced its recommended plans for the distribution of cobalt for the first half of 1952 and of nickel for the second quarter of 1952.<sup>2</sup>

All the 11 governments represented on the Committee have accepted the plan of distribution of cobalt. Nine have accepted the plan of distribution of nickel with the Federal Republic of Germany dissenting and the reply of India still outstanding.

The member countries are Belgium (for Benelux), Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Committee's recommendations have been forwarded to all interested governments for implementation.

The half-yearly plan of distribution for cobalt absorbs the provisional distribution for the first quarter announced on December 28, 1951.

Estimated production of cobalt metal, oxides, and salts for the second quarter remains the same as for the first quarter of 1952. The amount available for distribution in the first half of the year is estimated at 4,413 metric tons of metal content.

The Committee, in preparing the semiannual plan for cobalt, based its conclusions on the various aspects of each country's position: The importance of its defense program, its previous level of consumption as well as its stated requirements. In some cases, a reduction was made in the light of stated requirements from the level of the provisional allocation for the first quarter.

The plan of distribution of nickel for the second quarter of 1952 includes all marketable forms of primary nickel and oxides as in the first quarter. Nickel salts remain excluded.

The availabilities of primary nickel and oxides for the second quarter have been estimated at 34,964 metric tons in terms of nickel content as against 33,583 metric tons for the first quarter. The additional amount available in the second quarter comes principally from the Nicaro plant in Cuba and from French New Caledonia. Canadian production remains unchanged.

The Nicaro smelter, constructed during World War II and shut down soon after, has been reactivated because of increasing military requirements. The U.S. Government has made considerable investment and undertaken large financial risks in order to bring the Cuban plant back into produc-

<sup>2</sup> For plans of distribution, see IMC press release of Mar. 31.

tion. In view of the particular nature of the project the Committee has accepted a U.S. proposal that the Nicaro yield should be used to meet direct defense needs only and that all free world countries having such requirements should benefit from this additional source of supply in proportion to their direct defense effort.

The increased marginal production in New Caledonia is in the form of Fonte, which is a directly smelted nickel cast iron of about 30 percent nickel content. France will make available for export a quantity of 125 metric tons (nickel content) of Fonte. The distribution of this material will also alleviate critical cases and will provide an opportunity for experimenting in a new form of nickel which may become available in larger quantities during forthcoming quarters.

Prospects of increased production are encouraging but the supply situation for both metals is expected to remain critical for some time.

#### *Tungsten-Molybdenum*

The Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee of the International Materials Conference on March 28 announced its recommended distribution of tungsten and molybdenum for the first 6 months of 1952.<sup>3</sup> The provisional arrangements which had been made for the first quarter of 1952 are now incorporated in the 6 months plan.

The Governments of the countries represented on the Committee have accepted the recommended distribution, except the Government of Spain which has reserved its position. There are 13 members on this Committee: Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The distribution plans have also been forwarded to the governments of all countries not represented on the Committee for which allocations are recommended, with the request that they be implemented.

The needs of all countries, both member and nonmember, were equally considered. In this connection, the Committee intends to make a monthly review of the working of the plans, and it is hoped that any maladjustments in their implementation will then be brought to light and rectified.

Ores and concentrates and primary products of both metals are included in the plans. Primary products are defined, as in the case of previous distributions by the Committee, as ferro-tungsten, tungsten powder, tungstic acid and tungsten salts, and ferro-molybdenum, molybdic acid and molybdenum salts, including calcium-molybdate and molybdic oxide. Roasted molybdenum concentrates are regarded by the Committee as being included in ores and concentrates, as in the case of previous distribution plans.

<sup>3</sup> For tables of distribution, see IMC press release of Mar. 28.

The Committee estimates that the production of tungsten in the free world during the first 6 months of 1952 will be 8,200 metric tons metal content, and that the production of molybdenum will be 10,016 metric tons metal content.

Tungsten and molybdenum have been under international allocation since July 1, 1951. Although availabilities of the two metals have been increasing, they continue to remain in short supply. Data recently made public shows that free world availabilities of tungsten will have increased by about 20 percent in the second, over the first quarter of 1952. As compared to the first quarter of 1951, estimated production for the second quarter of 1952 has increased by about 80 percent. Free world supplies of molybdenum have increased over 10 percent in relation to the previous quarter of 1952. Over the year the increase in production amounts to just over 20 percent. Despite these improvements, the defense requirements of the free world of these alloying materials are such as to make it imperative that all participating countries do their utmost to implement the recommendations recently submitted to them by the Committee on measures of conservation and substitution.

Existing contracts are to be respected, so far as is possible, in carrying out the allocation arrangements. If such contracts provide for the supply of tungsten or molybdenum to any one importing country in excess of the amounts allocated, it is proposed that the importing country should divert shipments to other importing countries which have not yet filled their import quotas, so far as is possible without upsetting the original contractual arrangements.

#### **Frank L. Weil To Serve as 1952 Chairman for U.N. Day**

Secretary Acheson announced on April 2 that Frank L. Weil of New York City had accepted an invitation to serve as the 1952 Chairman of the National Citizens' Committee for United Nations Day—October 24, 1952. Mr. Weil, prominent New York lawyer, has been actively engaged in civic activities for many years.

Mr. Weil has met with Howland H. Sargeant, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, to discuss plans for the 1952 observance of United Nations Day. Emphasizing the importance of the United Nations as our best hope for bringing about peace and well-being in the world, Mr. Sargeant commended the National Citizens' Committee for its efforts in bringing about wider knowledge and understanding of what the United Nations is doing. He noted that for the first time in history people in 60 countries are joining in an observance of the same day—October 24, United Nations Day—as a symbol of their common aspirations.



Commemorating the birth of the United Nations, United Nations Day was officially established in 1947 by the General Assembly in a unanimous resolution inviting the support of the member governments and stating that the day "shall be devoted to making known to the peoples of the world the aims and achievements of the United Nations and to gaining their support for the work of the United Nations." The first such observance on an international scale was held in 1948.

Some 90 national organizations representing civic, veterans', fraternal, women's, labor, and educational groups compose the membership of the Committee. Headquarters are at Washington.

### **Plans for Eighth Pan American Railway Congress**

Membership of the Organizing Committee which will make the necessary arrangements for the eighth Pan American Railway Congress to be held in the United States at Washington, D.C., and Atlantic City, N.J., beginning on June 12, 1953, was announced on March 24 by the Department of State. The Congress is expected to bring to the United States several hundred delegates from the countries in Central and South America.

Headed by James G. Lyne, President of the Simmons-Boardman Publishing Corporation and Editor of *Railway Age*, as Chairman, Loyd J. Kiernan, Manager of Special Studies of the Association of American Railroads, as General Secretary, the Committee includes Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce; Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State; Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State; Clarke L. Willard, Associate Chief of the Division of International Conferences of the Department of State; and Charles D. Mahaffie, a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Others on the Committee are William T. Faricy, President of the Association of American Railroads; James M. Hood, President of the American Short Line Railroad Association; Arlon E. Lyon, Executive Secretary of the Railway Labor Executives Association; George P. Baker, Professor of Transportation of Harvard University's Graduate School of Business Administration; Emil E. Schnellbacher, Assistant Director of the Office of International Trade of the Department of Commerce; Herbert Ashton, Director of the Transportation, Communications, and

Utilities Division of the Office of International Trade of the Department of Commerce; and Walter S. Abernathy, Transportation Economist of the Office of International Trade of the Department of Commerce.

In addition, the Committee includes John W. Barriger, President of the Chicago, Indianapolis, and Louisville Railway, and Mrs. Barriger; C. McD. Davis, President of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad; Harry A. DeButts, President of the Southern System; J. D. Dodson, President and General Counsel of the Texas-Mexican Railway; J. A. Fisher, President of the Reading Company; Walter S. Franklin, President of the Pennsylvania Railroad; Donald V. Fraser, President of the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad; Fred G. Gurley, President of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway; Clark Hungerford, President of the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway; Wayne A. Johnston, President of the Illinois Central Railroad; D. P. Loomis, Chairman of the Association of Western Railways; G. Metzman, President of the New York Central System; Paul J. Neff, Chief Executive Officer of the Missouri Pacific Lines; D. J. Russell, President of the Southern Pacific Company; Lewis K. Silcox, Executive Vice President of the New York Air Brake Company; J. W. Smith, President of the Seaboard Air Line Railroad; and R. B. White, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway.

Industrial advisers on the Committee include Manuel Alonso, Manager of Foreign Sales of the American Locomotive Company; George W. Baughman, Vice President of the Union Switch and Signal Company; Nelson C. Dezendorf, General Manager of the Electro-Motive Division of General Motors Corporation; S. M. Felton, President of the Shippers' Car Line Corporation; C. L. Heater, Vice President of the American Steel Foundries; Charles Kerr, Jr., Consulting Transportation Engineer of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation; and Max K. Ruppert, First Vice President of Poor and Company.

Congresses of the Pan American Railway Congress Association usually convene every 3 years, the last one being held at México, D.F., Mexico, in the fall of 1950. The Association, of which the United States became a member in 1948, is made up of national governments, railroad companies, and railway supply manufacturers. The purpose of the organization is to promote the development and progress of railroads in the Western Hemisphere.

A few additional members of the Organizing Committee will be named at a later date.

## U. S. Delegations to International Conferences

### NATO Petroleum Committee

*The Department of State announced on April 1 that the following statement has been released to the press by the Secretariat of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization:*

The first meeting of the newly established North Atlantic Petroleum Planning Committee will be held April 2 in the London headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The committee has been under consideration since last summer and is established pursuant to a resolution introduced in the North Atlantic Council deputies by the United Kingdom Government early last December.

Petroleum experts from most of the NATO countries will attend the conference which has been called to prepare studies on the subject of the petroleum requirements of North Atlantic Treaty members in the event of an emergency. The committee will not concern itself with any current international petroleum problems.

The Petroleum Planning Committee is composed of a representative and an alternate from each member country of NATO desiring to participate, plus such additional advisers as member countries may wish to designate. The committee is directed to establish and maintain close working relations with other appropriate agencies of NATO having an interest in the subject, such as the Standing Group, the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping and the defense production, financial, and economic elements of NATO's international Secretariat.

*The United States delegation to the Petroleum Planning Committee meeting is composed of:*

C. Stribling Snodgrass—Assistant Deputy Administrator of the Petroleum Administration for Defense, Chairman of the delegation and U. S. representative to the North Atlantic Petroleum Planning Committee

Oscar Bransky—Petroleum Adviser of the European Office of Mutual Security Agency, Alternate U. S. representative to the North Atlantic Petroleum Committee

Charles Hedland—Petroleum Administration for Defense, Adviser

Col. G. H. Montgomery—Department of Defense, Adviser

C. J. Dwyer—Mutual Security Agency, Adviser

Robert Eakens—Petroleum Policy Staff, Department of State, Adviser

James W. Swihart—Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, Adviser

The following NATO countries have so far indicated that they will send delegations to the Petroleum Committee meeting: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.

### Status of Women

The Department of State announced on March 18 that Olive Remington Goldman, U.S. representative on the Commission on the Status of Women of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc), will attend the 6th session of the Commission, which will convene at Geneva, Switzerland, on March 24, 1952. She will be assisted by the following advisers:

Alice Angus Morrison, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor

Rachel C. Nason, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Ruth Woodsmall, Chief of Women's Affairs, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt on the Main, Germany

Among the items on the provisional agenda for this session are political rights of women; nationality of married women; status of women in public law; status of women in private law; educational opportunities for women; participation of women in the work of the United Nations; technical-assistance program in relation to the status of women; and the report of the Inter-American Commission of Women. The findings of the 6th session will be summarized in a report which will be submitted to Ecosoc.

The Commission on the Status of Women, which was established in 1946, is one of the nine permanent functional commissions of Ecosoc. The Commission is responsible for the preparation of recommendations and reports to the Council on the promotion of women's rights in political, economic, social, educational, and civil fields. Eighteen governments, elected by the Council, comprise the membership of the Commission. The last (5th) session of the Commission was held at Lake Success, April 30-May 14, 1951.

### Fisheries

The Department of State announced on March 18 that a conference on fisheries, sponsored by the Caribbean Commission, will convene at Port-of-

Spain, Trinidad, British West Indies, March 24-28, 1952. The U.S. delegation is as follows:

*Chairman*

Richard T. Whiteleather, Assistant Chief, Branch of Commercial Fisheries, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

*Delegates*

Luis Bonnet, San Juan, Puerto Rico  
Felix Inigo, San Juan, Puerto Rico

The Caribbean Commission is sponsoring a series of conferences for the purpose of increasing and disseminating the technical knowledge necessary to the development of the economic resources of the Caribbean area. The forthcoming Conference is considered particularly important in view

of the following factors: (1) fish is the principal protein in the diets of the Caribbean peoples; (2) the area is dependent upon the importation of fish; and (3) new techniques of fishing and marketing might make deep-sea fish from the Caribbean waters available at reasonable costs.

The provisional agenda for the Conference includes consideration of such matters as: occurrence and distribution of commercial fish species in the Caribbean; techniques practiced in the Caribbean for fish capture; types of fishing craft in use in the Caribbean; fish marketing, including storage and distribution; methods for conserving and processing fish in the Caribbean; cultivation of fish in ponds; application of recent technical knowledge to exploration and development of new fisheries; and various papers and reports.

## Reports of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

### THIRTY-SIXTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD DECEMBER 16-31, 1951<sup>1</sup>

U.N. doc. S/2541  
Transmitted February 6, 1952

I herewith submit report number 36 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 December, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 1114-1129, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The armistice negotiations continued on agenda item 3, concrete arrangements for carrying out the terms of the cease fire and armistice, and agenda item 4, prisoners of war, with some progress apparently being achieved on both items. The discussions were marked by the usual Communist intransigence including propaganda statements unrelated to a military armistice, evasive answers to pointed and pertinent questions, and puerile illogical arguments. This period, as in the past, was marked by an earnest and patient effort on the part of the United Nations Command delegation to reach a just and equitable agreement.

Agreement was reached on the following three principles for agenda item 3:

1. All armed forces under the control of either side, including all units and armed personnel of the ground, naval and air forces shall cease all hostilities within twenty-four hours after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective.
2. All armed forces under the control of either side shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within seventy-two hours after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. Except for such armed forces of a police nature as may be specifically agreed

to by both sides, no armed forces of either side shall thereafter enter the demilitarized zone; nor shall the armed forces of either side commit any acts of armed force against the demilitarized zone. Each side shall manage in accordance with the stipulations of the armistice agreement the administrative affairs of that portion of the demilitarized zone lying on its side of the military demarcation line.

3. All armed forces, ground, naval and air, under the control of either side shall be withdrawn, within five days after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, from the rear and coastal islands and waters of the other side, meaning islands which were formerly controlled by the other side and any others specifically and mutually agreed to. If they are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for delaying the withdrawal, the other side shall have the right to take all necessary action against such armed personnel for the maintenance of security and order.

The major issues which remained to be solved under agenda item 3 were as follows:

1. Rehabilitation of airfields
2. Aerial observation and aerial photography
3. Rotation and replenishment

The United Nations Command has held from the beginning that no military advantage should accrue to either side during the period of an armistice. The rehabilitation of airfields in Korea would afford the enemy a tremendous military advantage which is at present denied to him. Mutual air inspection constitutes a safeguard for both sides, yet the Communists have summarily rejected it as being unnecessary.

The Communists oppose unlimited rotation and replenishment. The United Nations Command holds that both sides should have the right to replace their personnel on a man-for-man, unit-for-unit basis and their equipment on a piece-for-piece basis. Otherwise attrition would result in a *de facto* withdrawal of forces from Korea. Such a withdrawal could be agreed to only on a governmental level.

In an earnest endeavor to reach agreement the United Nations Command delegation has introduced three new

<sup>1</sup>Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on Feb. 6. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report in the BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report in the BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; and the 35th report in the BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512.



proposals. These new proposals would, if accepted, make the major concessions to the Communist side. They show the purposeful intent of the United Nations Command to secure an armistice on honorable and equitable terms.

These concessions involve:

1. Elimination of aerial observation and
2. Provision for the rehabilitation of a reasonable number of airfields for civil air operations. The proposed United Nations Command principles are as follows:

(a) In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate a peaceful settlement by action at a political level, both sides undertake not to introduce into Korea any reinforcing military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. Such rotation of military personnel as within the limit agreed upon by both sides shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission so that the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations may be entrusted to conduct on-the-spot supervision and inspection, which shall be carried out at the ports of entry in rear agreed upon by both sides.

The rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations at specified points shall be agreed; such rehabilitation shall not include extension of runways. No other airfields shall be rehabilitated or constructed.

(b) Each side shall designate an equal number of members to form a Military Armistice Commission to be responsible for supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement and for settling through negotiation any violation of the armistice agreement. The functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the following two provisions:

- (1) Within the demilitarized zone, the Military Armistice Commission utilizing joint teams directly dispatched by it shall be responsible.

- (2) Outside the demilitarized zone, at the ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides and at the places where violations of the armistice have been reported to have occurred, a supervisory organ of representatives of non-combatant nations shall be entrusted to be responsible. Upon the request to the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations by both sides, or either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for investigation of a violation of the armistice agreement, the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations shall carry out the inspection.

(c) Both sides agree to invite nations acceptable to both sides which have not participated in the Korean War, to send, upon their consent, an equal number of representatives to form a supervisory organ to be entrusted by the Military Armistice Commission to be responsible for carrying out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) (2) of this agreement. Upon the request by both sides or either side on the Military Armistice Commission for carrying out these functions the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations shall dispatch immediately inspection teams to carry out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement at ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides, and at places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred outside the demilitarized zone, and shall report on the results of supervision and inspection to the Military Armistice Commission. In performing their above-stated functions, the inspection teams of non-combatant nations shall be accorded full convenience by both sides over the main lines of communication and transportation as agreed upon by both sides.

In preliminary discussions on item 4, the United Nations Command insisted on two essential steps prior to reaching an agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war:

1. Exchange of prisoners of war data to include numbers, nationality, names and locations of prisoners of war held by both sides, and

2. Authority for the entry into Communist prisoner of war camps of International Committee of the Red Cross Delegates who were immediately available for prisoner of war relief work.

While initially the Communists resisted strongly any exchange of prisoner of war information prior to reaching final agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war, continued pressure by the United Nations Command delegation eventually forced from them an agreement to produce some of the required information. On 18 December 1951 they furnished a list of prisoners of war whom they alleged were available for exchange, including 3,198 United States, 1,216 other United Nations Command and 7,142 Republic of Korea, totalling 11,556. This total was immediately challenged by United Nations Command as being entirely disproportionate to the total number of missing in action suffered during the war and completely at variance with the information United Nations Command had obtained from a variety of sources which indicated many more prisoners of war should be alive in Communist custody. After insistent demands, the Communists have agreed to furnish additional evidence of the whereabouts of approximately 1,000 names furnished to them by United Nations Command which were not on the Communist lists. After much more discussion, they agreed reluctantly on 29 December 1951 to produce what they claim will be a full report on all prisoners taken by them since the start of the war. Even with this concession, the Communists delegates laid the basis for further excuses by claiming that any data they produce would be incomplete because of the absence of records allegedly due to destruction during the war.

The United Nations Command on the other hand, indicated its willingness to provide Communists with a complete accounting for all prisoners of war ever held, even though the United Nations Command had been regularly forwarding prisoner of war records through Washington to Geneva. The United Nations Command indicated that it had nothing to hide, and consistent with the completeness of the data furnished by the individual prisoner of war, would disclose to the Communists, as rapidly as the large number of prisoners of war involved permitted, any data they required.

Despite repeated efforts by the United Nations Command delegation to secure agreement on the entry of International Committee of the Red Cross delegates into North Korean prisoner of war camps to assist in relief work, the Communists would not acquiesce. The Communists, when faced with that wording of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to prisoners of war which related to visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross, were evasive; they virtually implied that they would observe such portions of the Geneva Convention as suited their purposes. They were immediately reminded by the United Nations Command of the official promise made by the North Korean Government in the early days of the war that the North Korean Army would abide by the Convention, even though they were not signatory to it. Refusal now to live up to their word reaffirms our belief that any agreement we may enter into with the Communist must include adequate safeguards which would not leave the matter of compliance dependent merely upon their good faith. Conversely, the United Nations Command has consistently supported the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross permitting free access to all its prisoners of war camps and lending every effort to assist the International Committee of the Red Cross wherever possible. The consistent unwillingness of the Communists to permit the International Committee of the Red Cross to accomplish the basic humanitarian purposes for which it was organized is beyond comprehension. In a further effort to secure agreement, the Commander-in-Chief, on 21 December 1951 addressed a personal communication to the Commanders of the North Korean and

Chinese Communists Forces in which he emphasized the desirability of permitting International Committee of the Red Cross to carry out its work in North Korean prisoner of war camps, pointing out that military forces in previous wars have always recognized the neutral position of this organization and have encouraged its assistance. In reply, on 24 December 1951, the Communists made a typically evasive answer, attempting to lay the blame for delay in armistice negotiations on the United Nations Command, claiming the prisoners of war they hold are getting excellent treatment and do not need outside assistance. The Communists suggested, however, that as a concession to the United Nations Command, they would have no objection to the formation of joint teams of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Cross of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Chinese People's Republic going to the prisoner of war camps of both sides to assist in supervising the prisoners of war exchange after the armistice agreement was signed. The obvious and understandable reaction of the senior delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross when this information was presented to him by the United Nations Command, was that this proposal was entirely untenable since it would violate completely the neutral position the International Committee of the Red Cross has continually maintained as its fundamental concept. Obviously the Communist intent was to attempt to identify the International Committee of the Red Cross as a United Nations Agent, thus providing them with propaganda material for their continued non-observance of the Geneva Convention.

In the hope that some sort of agreement might be eventually forced from the Communists, the United Nations Command requested from Geneva additional International Committee of the Red Cross delegates to be available for entry into North Korea should permission be secured, and to assist the United Nations Command in that part of the prisoner of war exchange which would occur in its area. On 27 December 1951, six delegates arrived in Tokyo. They will proceed to Eighth Army after a short period of orientation and will prepare their plans for future operations.

On 24 December 1951, the Communists suggested that Christmas letters from prisoners of war be exchanged via the sub-delegation on agenda item 4. This was immediately accepted by the United Nations Command delegation. Arrangements were expanded on the United Nations Command side to establish not only delivery facilities for United Nations Command and Republic of Korea prisoners of war in Communist hands and for Communist prisoners of war in United Nations Command custody; but action was also taken to establish a temporary postal service to handle incoming mail to United Nations Command and Republic of Korea prisoners of war. This information, complete with details on how mail should be addressed, was given world-wide publicity. In this connection, however, it is desired to point out that the United Nations Command has always given its prisoners of war free and unlimited mail privileges and encouraged their use. The provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention in this regard have always been strictly complied with.

The thirty-day period during which the armistice was to be negotiated (following the agreement on November 27 on the principles governing the establishment of a military demarcation line) passed on December 27 without any formal action being taken.

Action along the Korean battlefield remained minor in nature, constant United Nations Command patrolling served to reveal improvements in the enemy's defensive positions. Numerous hard-fought clashes reflected the enemy's determination not to be dislodged from his present entrenchments. Although the enemy did not initiate any major ground action, his patrols and small-scale probing attacks during the hours of darkness clearly showed his desire to obtain current combat intelligence. In only three instances did these efforts involve units larger than a company. The entire course of the enemy's forward battle positions, and especially his artillery positions, were

subjected to constant United Nations Command artillery bombardment. In addition to the resultant steady attrition of enemy manpower and matériel, incessant United Nations Command artillery fire continued to confine enemy movement and activities in the forward areas to hours of darkness and seriously restricted the firing of enemy artillery. Early in the period prisoners reported the dissolution of the major component elements of the VI North Korean Corps. Front lines remained unchanged during the period. In the United Nations Command rear areas the anti-guerrilla actions succeeded in drastically reducing the strength of these dissident elements.

On the western front United Nations Command patrols encountered strong opposition from forward Chinese Communist combat elements. Rapid and aggressive enemy counter-action resulted from attacks by United Nations Command raiding parties. Despite the resolute resistance offered to United Nations Command patrols these actions often resulted in the withdrawal of the enemy unit engaged. Most frequent patrol contacts on this front were effected in Sagimak area. On 18 December the Sagimak area was also the site of one of the heaviest enemy attacks of the period. An enemy battalion made two unsuccessful attempts to pierce United Nations Command outpost positions. A similar attack which met with only slight initial success occurred in the Punji area on 28 December.

Battle action on the central front resembled that of the western front. The Suta area was the site of the most frequent patrol encounters. Anti-tank mines along the approaches to enemy positions at times hindered the movement of United Nations Command armored patrols. With the exception of a relief of an enemy division in the Pyonggang area by local reserves, the disposition of enemy units remained unchanged.

Except for the Mulguji area, action on the eastern front followed the same pattern of aggressive patrolling by both sides. Between 25 and 28 December enemy units up to battalion strength made repeated night attacks against United Nations Command positions in the Mulguji area. Initial slight enemy gains resulted in the stubbornly contested and successful counter-actions fought in rugged snow-covered terrain. During the previous period the I North Korean Corps followed the earlier movement of the VI North Korean Corps from the western to extreme eastern battle area. This redistribution resulted in the consolidation in the eastern sector of all major North Korean combat elements in the forward areas. This movement, apparently designed to bolster the effectiveness of the North Korean Army, was immediately followed by the apportionment of the three divisions of the VI North Korean Corps to increase the troops strength of other North Korean units. This action distinctly portrays the manpower shortage within North Korea resulting from heavy losses inflicted by the United Nations Command during the eighteen months of combat.

Republic of Korea security elements in the southwestern portion of the Korean Peninsula swept into the second phase of the anti-guerrilla campaign. The number of guerrilla units engaged showed a reduction from the previous period. This was due principally to the direction of all guerrilla resources toward self-preservation by evading contact with Republic of Korea elements. Nevertheless, the vigorous and well-planned actions of the Security Elements resulted in the further appreciable reduction of guerrilla strength within the Republic of Korea.

The practice of securing replacements for some units from other divisional units of the VI North Korean Corps slightly reduces the number of combat units available for employment by the enemy. With the exception of this diminution, the enemy's offensive capability remains unaltered. Although the enemy continues his efforts to maintain a high state of combat preparedness, he has not disclosed any intent to pass from defensive to offensive operations within the near future.

Snow, heavy seas and poor visibility characterized the Korean weather during the last two weeks of December.



In spite of unfavorable conditions United Nations Command surface and Naval Air Forces maintained a "steel curtain" along both coasts of North Korea concentrating the heaviest attacks in Central Korea. Shells and rockets were delivered around the clock in supporting fire at the battle line; interdiction firing at Kojo, Wonsan, Hungnam, Songjin, and Chongjin on the east coast; and harassment firing on enemy troops and supplies in the Chinnampo, Haeju and Han River areas on the west coast. Heavy damage and many personnel losses were inflicted on the enemy by these incessant bombardments.

Naval air strikes from the carriers and Marine air strikes from carrier and shore bases continued interdiction and close air support missions with excellent results. Numerous bridge and rail cuts, enemy munition and supply dumps, and hundreds of enemy personnel caught in exposed positions were added to the lists of damages and casualties imposed by United Nations Command Naval Air operations.

Helicopters furnishing rescue services, air spot, and liaison continued to play an important role in the Korean War. The loss of a Neptune patrol plane in the Sea of Japan on the stormy night after Christmas was dramatized by the destroyer rescue of six of the crew from a raft, an hour and forty minutes after the plane ditched because of engine trouble.

United Nations Command aircraft under the control of the Far East Air Forces, flying an average of 700 sorties per day continued to attack targets throughout Communist-dominated Korea although heavy weather, cloud cover and reduced visibility adversely affected the intensity of the attacks. The primary objectives of the United Nations Command air attacks, conducted both by day and by night, were the interdiction of enemy rail and highway traffic, neutralization of airfield in North Korea and the provision of close air support as called for by the United Nations Command ground forces. Although armed reconnaissance aircraft found few enemy troops in the open, they were able to detect and destroy many camouflaged supply buildings, military dumps and artillery positions with the aid of the contrast provided by winter landscapes.

Fighter-bombers and light bombers, during both day and night interdiction operations, reported rail lines cut in 1,030 places and the damage or destruction of 1,730 vehicles, twenty-two locomotives and 501 railroad cars as well as miscellaneous targets such as bridges, roads, supply carts, and tunnels.

The enemy air-to-air activity over northwest Korea showed a decided decline over the previous period due, in all probability, to snow cover and low ceilings at Communist bases in Manchuria, as well as multiple layers of clouds over Korea. Strong forces of MIG 15's were observed on seven days, with a new high of 360 enemy aircraft observed by the United Nations Command pilots on 29 December. The enemy proved to be generally non-aggressive and avoided combat on most occasions. As a result of the enemy's non-aggressiveness, United Nations Command pilots were able to account for only three MIGs destroyed and four damaged during this period. The recent commitment by United States Air Force of an additional group of F-86 fighter aircraft has improved appreciably the United Nations Command air-to-air and air defense capability in Korea.

Electronic aids to navigation and bombing permitted the Far East Air Force Bomber and Combat Cargo Commands to continue unrestricted operations, despite the inclement weather over Korea. A total of 9,800 tons of air cargo, including 44,000 passengers and air evacuation patients, were transported in support of United Nations Command units. A special phase of the cargo operations was the accelerated delivery of backlogged holiday mail and packages for United Nations Command personnel in the front lines. B-29's, with bombs and leaflets, were dispatched nightly against targets in North Korea.

The joint air ground operations center in Korea reported no air alerts. On two occasions United Nations Command aircraft operating over friendly areas reported night air-to-air encounters with unidentified aircraft.

A screening and investigation of individuals detained in the United Nations Command prisoner of war camps has disclosed the presence of approximately 37,500 civilian residents of the Republic of Korea. The detention of these civilians was attributable to various circumstances attendant upon the confusion inseparable from hostilities such as the displacement of large masses of the civilian population. A thorough rescreening of these civilians is now being conducted jointly by the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Command to insure that none are dangerous to security of the United Nations Command forces. The civilians, all citizens of the Republic of Korea, have now been segregated from the prisoners of war in separate camps and, following the rescreening, will gradually be released to return to their homes. The United Nations Command has furnished the International Committee of the Red Cross at Geneva with complete information concerning this group, including the names of all individuals concerned.

70,000,000 leaflets were airdropped over the principal cities of Northern Korea and the enemy forces in the front lines during the three day period of 24, 25 and 26 December. These leaflets emphasized the United Nations efforts towards establishing peace by reiterating the friendship of the United Nations for the Korean and Chinese people and expressing hope for a new year of peace and amity. The dissemination of these messages was a major step in the continuing drive to make clear to the soldiers and civilians throughout the Communist-occupied areas of Korea the duplicity of their leaders in advocating peace while practicing aggression. News sheets and radio broadcasts, as well as other leaflets, carried full reports of the armistice negotiations, explaining in detail the reasons for the United Nations stand on each question and the Communist tactics of obstruction and delay.

A memorandum of understanding has been consummated between the United Nations Command and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. Under the terms of this memorandum, the existing agreements governing relations between the United Nations Command and United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency have been interpreted and made effective. While military operations are in progress (known as phase 1), the United Nations Command has sole responsibility for the operation of all projects of relief and economic aid in Korea. During this phase, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency planning teams will be maintained in Tokyo and Korea. Joint United Nations Command-United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency Committees are being established in Tokyo and in Korea for the resolution of mutual problems and responsibilities and for planning for phase two of the agreement, when United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency will assume operational responsibility in Korea. During the current phase, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency civilian technical and staff personnel on the operating level in Korea, are attached to and integrated in the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea.

RIDGWAY

### THIRTY-SEVENTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1-15, 1952<sup>2</sup>

U.N. doc. S/2550  
Transmitted March 4, 1952

I herewith submit report number 37 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 January 1952 inclusive. United Nations Command communications numbers 1130-1144, provide detailed accounts of the operations.

<sup>2</sup>Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U. S. representative in the Security Council, on Mar. 4.

April 14, 1952

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The discussion of agenda item number 3 centered on the three principles proposed by the United Nations Command delegation and quoted in United Nations Command report number 36. Although some slight progress was made, the stand taken by the Communists causes increasing doubt as to their true intentions toward an armistice. They continue to oppose any restriction on the rehabilitation of airfields, their arguments centering on "Sovereign rights" and "interference in internal affairs". The United Nations Command considers these arguments to be illogical and contradictory. Any armistice agreement must necessarily concomitantly result in some abridgment of so-called sovereign rights. The significant fact is that such abridgment is voluntarily assumed and mutually agreed to by the nations concerned. The right to agree, as the United Nations Command delegation has stated to the Communist delegates, is the very essence of sovereignty. The Communists have already agreed to limitations on the introduction of personnel and equipment and to observation by non-combatant teams; and they admit that such provisions are required to insure against an increase in military capabilities. The United Nations Command holds that restriction on increase in military air capabilities is also a fundamental safeguard. Additional combat airfields closer to the battle line would permit additional sorties per day by the same aircraft. This would result in a definite increase in military air capability. For either side to construct combat airfields during an armistice, therefore, would cause tensions which would jeopardize the duration of the agreement. The United Nations Command has agreed to the rehabilitation of sufficient airfields in North Korea to insure the full conduct of North Korean civil affairs. Hence, the Communist insistence on unlimited airfield construction is obviously detrimental to the basic objectives of the armistice agreement. It is noteworthy that the United Nations Command delegation has repeatedly asked the question: "Do you agree that neither side should increase its military air capabilities during the period of the armistice?". This question has always met with an evasive, equivocal reply from the Communist side.

In an effort to reach a sound solution to the problem of exchanging prisoners of war which would be acceptable to both the United Nations Command and the Communists and at the same time preserve the most humanitarian aspects of repatriation, the United Nations Command armistice delegation introduced the following proposal, which incorporates provisions for all prisoners of war and civilians who have been involved in the conflict:

"Prisoners of war who elect repatriation shall be exchanged on a 1-for-1 basis until one side has exchanged all such prisoners of war held by it.

"The side which thereafter holds prisoners of war shall repatriate all those prisoners of war who elect to be repatriated in a 1-for-1 exchange for foreign civilians interned by the other side, and for civilians and other persons of the one side who are at the time of the signing of the armistice in the territory under control of the other side, and who elect to be repatriated. Prisoners of war thus exchanged shall be paroled to the opposing force, such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual shall not again bear arms against the side releasing him.

"All prisoners of war not electing repatriation shall be released from prisoner of war status and shall be paroled, such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual will not again bear arms in the Korean conflict.

"All remaining civilians of either side who are, at the time of the signing of the armistice, in territory under control of the other side, shall be repatriated if they so elect.

"In order to insure that the choice regarding repatriation is made without duress, delegates of the International Committee of The Red Cross shall be permitted to interview all prisoners of war at the points of exchange, and all civilians of either side who are at the time of the signing of the armistice in territory under the control of the other side."

In defining "civilians" as used in this proposal, the United Nations Command emphasized they were considered to be individuals of either side who on 25 June 1950 were bona-fide residents under the Republic of Korea or the Communist regime in North Korea.

In summary, the United Nations Command proposal provides for the release of all prisoners of war including soldiers of one side who may have been impressed into the armed forces of the other side. It was pointed out to the Communists that the United Nations Command proposal was consistent in every respect with the initial Communist claim that all prisoners of war of both sides should be released.

As regards repatriation, the proposal permits freedom of choice of the individual thus insuring that no duress or force will be exercised to influence him. It provides repatriation not only for prisoners of war, but for displaced persons and refugees as well, who can equally be considered as victims of war. Those who so desire are permitted to return to their homes as soon as possible. Finally, the United Nations Command proposal provides for a supervisory organ to interview the persons involved, to insure that, whatever their choice, it will be made freely and without fear.

The initial reaction of the Communists in protesting the United Nations Command proposal was characterized by a series of vicious and slanderous remarks, among which the United Nations Command was accused of attempting to keep prisoners of war in slavery, to hold them as hostages and prevent the civilian population in the United Nations Command zone from being repatriated. After continued and sometimes exasperating discussion, it became quite clear that the basic objection to the United Nations Command proposal was not that the Communists did not recognize its workability and humanitarian features, but that they were alarmed at the possibility that large numbers of the prisoners we held and of the North Korean refugee population now in Southern Korea, would refuse return to Communist control. It appeared most significant that, while supposedly arguing the right of impressed Republic of Korea Army soldiers to remain in the Communist forces, the Communists insisted that prisoners of war of both sides should be forcefully repatriated.

Throughout subsequent discussion, the Communists have attempted to play a variety of themes all aimed at discrediting the United Nations Command proposal. They have been completely unsuccessful in advancing one valid statement that can refute the United Nations Command proposal to extend the right to elect repatriation to every prisoner and civilian internee now in our custody and to every civilian who fled into South Korea at the start of the war. We have emphasized that the decision of each prisoner of war with reference to his repatriation would be openly and publicly expressed before a representative of the International Red Cross at the point of exchange, and that the United Nations Command proposal stands openly and conclusively as the most humanitarian, equitable approach to the exchange of prisoners of war, civilians and refugees, and entirely in consonance with the spirit of the Geneva Convention.

The enemy displayed only limited offensive tendencies in the battle area and confined his action mainly to night patrolling and probing attacks employing units up to the strength of a company. One exception to this pattern of activity occurred in the extreme Western sector of the battle line where advances gained by a limited United Nations Command attack were nullified by a successful counterattack by strong enemy forces. During daylight hours the enemy concentrated his efforts towards turning back the numerous United Nations Command patrols. The front lines remained unchanged during the period. Continued anti-guerrilla operations further impaired the dwindling strength of guerrilla forces within the Republic of Korea.

Fighting in the Punji area was heavy as contrasted to the patrol activity along the remainder of the Western front. United Nations Command elements attacked on 3 January to complete the restoration of outpost positions

which had been lost as a result of an enemy attack on 28 December. Five days of almost constant fighting were required to drive the numerically equal enemy defenders from these positions. The immediate commitment of two additional enemy regiments to a daylight counterattack forced the United Nations Command elements from the disputed positions. It is estimated that approximately 3,000 casualties were inflicted on the enemy units during the course of this action.

There were no major military developments on the Western or Eastern fronts, the battle scene being dominated by aggressive patrolling by both sides. On two successive nights, 3 and 4 January, strong enemy combat patrols forced the withdrawal of United Nations Command outpost positions in the Mulguju area. On both occasions the positions were fully restored by immediate United Nations Command counter-action.

The second phase of the anti-guerrilla operation in the Southwestern portion of the Korean peninsula was completed on 5 January and the third phase was initiated the following day. As a consequence of earlier successes, the number and size of the dissident groups encountered is decreasing steadily. In February 1951 the effective guerrilla strength within the Republic of Korea was estimated at approximately 27,000. Despite the continuous recruitment of additional followers by the guerrillas, the Republic of Korea security forces held this sizeable threat in check and by November 1951 had reduced the dissident strength to an estimated 10,000. During the past six weeks an intensified anti-guerrilla operation has further reduced the guerrilla forces to a strength of about 6,000 effectives.

The enemy's offensive capability remains unaltered. Prisoners of war fail to profess any knowledge of plans for an early offensive. On the contrary, recent prisoners of war reports indicate only plans to continue the defense. The bulk of the available evidence supports the prisoners of war allegations which point to the enemy's maintenance of his present defensive attitude.

In the first weeks of 1952 United Nations Command naval forces and naval and marine air squadrons exerted strenuous efforts to help prevent an enemy build-up during the lull in ground operations. Sustained ground interdiction was continued along both coasts by the surface blockading forces in night and day attacks. Their harassing and supporting bombardments inflicted personnel and material losses on the enemy at the battleline and at major North Korean coastal communication centers.

Carrier and land-based naval and marine air squadrons continued the interdiction of enemy rail, highway and sea routes in spite of marginal weather conditions. Patrol squadrons maintained reconnaissance of enemy waters, and furnished anti-submarine patrols for friendly supply convoys.

Minesweeping and naval artillery support fire continued on a round-the-clock basis. The United States minesweeper *Dextrous*, operating near Wonsan, lost one killed and two wounded when she was hit several times by 75 millimeter gunfire from enemy shore-based batteries.

United Nations Command air attacks constituted the most aggressive type of action during the reporting period. The enemy continued to counter these attacks with active air defense forces and passive defense measures which made ground targets difficult to locate and destroy. The combination of small arms ground fire, anti-aircraft artillery concentrations and high performance interceptor aircraft accounted for the destruction of thirty-nine United Nations Command aircraft. Despite frequent air-to-air combat between MIG-15 and United Nations Command aircraft the losses on both sides have been comparatively light. Pilots report that many flights of the enemy interceptors are non-aggressive and tend to

avoid combat even when they have strong advantages in position and numbers. On other occasions United Nations Command pilots have engaged flights of MIGs which exhibited aggressive spirit, improved tactics and a high degree of pilot technique. On those occasions little advantage is enjoyed by either side and claims for kills and the number of damaged aircraft remains low. This trend in MIG operations is now quite pronounced and lends credence to the theory that Northwest Korea is being used by Communist forces for systematic advanced training of fighter pilots. United Nations Command pilots claim destruction of twelve MIGs and damage to twenty more in air-to-air combat.

The bulk of the fighter-bomber and medium bomber effort was again directed at interdiction of enemy railroad facilities. During daylight hours the principal targets were rail cuts along the open lines and attacks on locomotives, rail cars and supply stacks adjacent to the right of way. At night medium bombers attacked key bridges in the North Korean rail system. The extent of the unrepaired and damaged rail lines south of the Chong-Chon River has permitted the allocation of some rail interdiction effort to targets North of the previous rail interdiction boundary.

United Nations Command army requirements for close support sorties were furnished whenever lucrative targets were uncovered. Aircraft of the Republic of Korea Air Force provided close support for anti-guerrilla operations in rear areas.

Enemy or unidentified aircraft were reported over United Nations Command positions on three occasions. These were all night nuisance attacks with damage to friendly installations being reported as superficial. A typical example occurred during the pre-dawn hours on 1 January when low performance aircraft dropped mortar-shell type fragmentation bombs in the Seoul-Inchon area. There were no United Nations Command casualties, but one Korean farmer was killed and two others injured.

United Nations Command leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, and radio broadcasts reported to enemy soldiers, and to Korean civilians under Communist subjugation, the protraction of armistice negotiations by the continued stalling tactics of Communist spokesmen at Panmunjon. These United Nations Command media reiterated the determination of the Korean people and the United Nations Command forces to press for the early conclusion of a just and realistic armistice agreement despite continuing Communist obstruction of efforts to restore peace. Wide publicity was given to the United Nations Command proposal to allow prisoners of war to exercise freedom of choice in repatriation. Radio broadcasts and news sheets explained in detail the necessity for prohibiting construction or rehabilitation of military airfields during the period following an armistice.

Under the terms of the approved memorandum of understanding between the United Nations Command and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, the Joint United Nations Command-United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency Committee in Tokyo held its initial meeting on 5 January 1952. The meetings, leading towards initial understanding and agreement, dealt with the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency organization, committee membership, rules of procedure, United Nations Command and United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency joint operation, and the procurement of personnel for implementing the civil assistance and economic aid program. The mission of this joint committee is the resolution of mutual problems and responsibilities, during phase one when the United Nations Command has operational responsibility, and planning for phase two when the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency will assume operational responsibility.

RIDGWAY

## The United States in the United Nations

March 28–April 10, 1952

### General Assembly

*United Nations Commission To Investigate Conditions for Free Elections in Germany*—The Commission returned to its headquarters in Geneva on March 25 after consultations in Bonn with the Allied High Commission for Germany and with the Government officials of the Federal Republic of Germany, who agreed to grant the Commission all facilities it requested to enable it to undertake its work in the Federal Republic of Germany and western sectors of Berlin.

Mr. Kristjan Albertson (Iceland), Chairman of the Commission, stated that no reply had come from General Vassily Chuikov, Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission, to the two letters sent by the Commission on February 22 and March 10 expressing its wish to discuss arrangements with the authorities in the Soviet zone of Germany and in the eastern sector of Berlin. On March 26 a third letter was sent stating, *inter alia*:

The Commission's ability to undertake the work entrusted to it by the United Nations is now entirely dependent on the willingness of the responsible authorities in the Soviet zone of Germany and in the eastern sector of Berlin to conclude similarly satisfactory agreements with the Commission.

### Security Council

*Disarmament Commission*—At the March 28 meeting, Chairman David M. Johnson (Canada), under Rule 23 of the Disarmament Commission's Rules of Procedure, ruled that specific charges of bacteriological warfare use or any other kind of warfare should not be raised in the Commission. Mr. Malik (U.S.S.R.) challenged this ruling, which was put to a vote and supported by all the members except the Soviet Union.

On April 2 by a vote of 10–1 (U.S.S.R.)–1 (China) two Working Committees were established, each consisting of all members, to be known as Committee I and Committee II. Committee I will be responsible for studying and reporting to the Commission on the matters which are mentioned under B in the Program of Work adopted on March 28, namely, "Regulation of all armaments and armed forces." Committee II will

be responsible for studying and reporting to the Commission on the matters covered by point A in the Program of Work, entitled "Disclosure and verification of all armaments, including atomic armaments, and of all armed forces." The Canadian proposal that the working committees should normally meet in closed session was rejected by 6–0–6 (Chile, China, France, Pakistan, the United States, U.S.S.R.).

At the first meeting of Committee I, April 4, Ambassador Benjamin V. Cohen (U.S.) stated:

The United States desires to find ways and means of devising safeguards which will insure that the obligations undertaken will be kept. . . . In my opening statement in the Disarmament Commission, I tried to outline some of the objectives and principles which we all must accept if we wish to do something about, and not merely talk about, disarmament. . . .

1. We should agree that the goal of disarmament is not to regulate but to prevent war, by making war inherently and constitutionally impossible as a means of adjusting disputes between nations. 2. . . . we must eliminate mass armies and all instruments of mass destruction. That means that no nation should be in such a state of armed preparedness as to be able to undertake a major war. We believe that armed forces and armaments should be reduced by international agreement to these levels (a) necessary for the maintenance of internal order; (b) necessary for the maintenance of peace through the United Nations collective-security system. 3. We all must agree and accept such foolproof safeguards so that we can all feel safe and sure that no nation is in a position to wage a successful war.

At the Committee II meeting, April 5, Ambassador Cohen submitted the U.S. proposals for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, in five stages, of armed forces and armaments, including atomic. The first stage, he noted, was neither small nor unimportant in scope. He said

It is a count of armed forces and of the locations and facilities concerned with armaments of all types, including atomic. We do feel that any progress that can be made in the field of disclosure and verification will greatly facilitate progress in the field of limitation, reduction and elimination of armed forces and armaments.

It was not true, he further pointed out, that the U.S. plan neglected atomic weapons in favor of conventional weapons. "Upon the successful completion of the first stage, all states will be in a position to calculate within measurable limits the potential strength in atomic weapons of all other states." Regarding the Soviet argument that



Commission discussions of disclosure and verification would get nowhere until it first made a decision to reduce armaments and prohibit atomic warfare, Ambassador Cohen pointed out that "Until we know more clearly what we are going to do, we can hardly decide in what time sequence we should do it."

### **Economic and Social Council**

*Commission on Status of Women*—The Commission held its sixth session at Geneva March 24 through April 4. It rejected the usual Soviet motion to unseat the Chinese Nationalist representative as being unacceptable in view of the General Assembly resolution 396 providing that questions on representation of states be referred to the Assembly or its Interim Committee.

The Commission concluded examination of the Draft Convention on the Political Rights of Women and adopted a resolution, (13-0-3 (Soviet bloc)), recommending that Ecosoc open the Convention for signature. The Convention is designed to eliminate all discrimination against women in the field of political rights. Among other resolutions adopted were (1) Resolution (11-0-6) calling for effective implementation of the principle of equal pay for equal work for men and women workers. It recommends that all member states of the ILO introduce as soon as possible, by means of proper legislation and other measures, equal remuneration for equal work of men and women, urges adoption and implementation of this principle in all countries which are not members of the ILO, and requests the Commission on Human Rights to include in the Draft Covenant on Human Rights an article providing for the principle of equal remuneration. (2) Resolution (11-0-4) on participation of women in the work of the United Nations. It notes with disappointment that very few women occupy policy-making posts in the United Nations; urges the Secretary-General to continue appointing women to these posts in the Secretariat.

### **Trusteeship Council**

The tenth session of the Trusteeship Council came to a close at U.N. Headquarters on April 1, 1952. During almost 5 weeks of the busy "winter session" which began on February 27, the Council devoted most of its time to consideration of annual reports on the administration of the four Trust Territories in the Pacific area. In addition to consideration of the written reports which were submitted prior to the opening of the session, the Council heard statements by the Special Representative of each of the Administering Authorities concerned: New Zealand for Western Samoa, Australia for New Guinea and Nauru, and the United States for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. During the question period follow-

ing the statement for each territory, special attention was given to questions of political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of that territory. The Council adopted specific recommendations on each territory, taking note of progress achieved, urging continued effort in certain fields, and, in some cases, requesting that additional information be furnished to the Council.

The special representative of the United States for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was Senator Elbert D. Thomas, High Commissioner of the Trust Territory. To supplement the written and oral information presented to the Council by the United States, a film on the Trust Territory was shown. Various members of the Council made generally commendatory statements on the U.S. administration of the Trust Territory. In addition, the Council adopted resolutions noting the progress achieved in several different fields and making suggestions and recommendations for future action. In the political and economic fields, for example, the United States was asked to continue its efforts to extend the electoral system and foster local initiative in the creation of regional representative bodies and to continue its efforts to develop the material resources and the transportation services of the Trust Territory. The Council also expressed hope that organic legislation for the Trust Territory would soon be enacted. In the social field, particular satisfaction was expressed at progress made in public health. In education, the Council suggested the possibility of an expanded scheme of scholarships to enable inhabitants to seek higher education outside the Trust Territory.

Acting on the reports of its newly established Standing Committee on Petitions, the Council during the latter part of its tenth session adopted resolutions on each of 35 petitions which had been examined. Additional arrangements for the forthcoming Visiting Mission to West Africa were made with the selection of Australia, Belgium, China, and El Salvador to nominate the individual members of the Mission. The Mission is to begin its visit to the four West African trust territories in August. The Council endorsed a report on the organization and functioning of visiting missions prepared by a committee of the Council and also approved a report by the Secretary-General on arrangements for administering offers of scholarships for inhabitants of Trust Territories. Final action on the revised Questionnaire to serve as the basis for future annual reports by the Administering Authorities was deferred until the next session. On another question, that of associating Trust Territory inhabitants more closely in its work, the Council established a six-member committee—El Salvador, France, Iraq, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States—to study the matter and report to the next session.

## Presidential Mission to Korea

[Released to the press April 4]

A special Presidential mission headed by Clarence Meyer will depart for Pusan, Korea, on April 5, 1952, to discuss economic and financial problems of the Republic of Korea with officials of that Government.

Mr. Meyer, who is the Chief of the Special Mission for Economic Cooperation in Austria and was formerly Chief of the ECA Mission in Korea, has been made available especially for this mission on a temporary basis after which he will return to his post in Vienna. He will be assisted by Clarence Heer of the University of North Carolina and the following representatives of the Departments of Defense, Treasury, and State:

Maj. Gen. Stanley L. Scott, senior military representative  
Col. W. S. Everett, Army  
Col. L. M. Gosorn, Army  
Lt. Col. L. J. Fuller, Jr., Army  
1st Lt. H. A. Fisher, Army  
Dr. R. W. E. Reid, Army  
R. Hirshtritt, Treasury  
William G. Jones, State

Mr. Meyer will discuss with officials of the Republic of Korea economic and financial problems, arising in connection with operations of the U.N. Command, and measures to help stabilize the economy of Korea.

### THE CONGRESS

## Initiation of New Refugee Resettlement Program

[Released to the press by the White House March 24]

*The President, on March 22, sent identical letters to Tom Connally, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate; James P. Richards, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives; Richard B. Russell, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate; and Carl Vinson, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. The text of the letter follows:*

In compliance with Section 101 (a) (1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, I hereby notify you that I have today determined that it will contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic area and to the security of the United States to initiate a program to improve the reception and treatment and to secure the resettlement of qualified people who escape from the Iron Curtain area. This program will supplement, but in no sense supersede, the efforts now being made by the countries

bordering on the Iron Curtain area which carry the main responsibility for taking care of these people.

This program has been recommended to me by the Director for Mutual Security with the concurrence of the agencies concerned. It is their estimate that approximately \$4,300,000 of funds appropriated under Title I of the Mutual Security Act will be required for the calendar year 1952 to fund this program, which together with \$2,900,000 planned to be obtained from other sources including counterpart and privately contributed funds, will make possible the carrying out of this program.

Representatives of the Executive Branch are prepared, at your convenience, to provide you and your Committee colleagues personally with further information about this program if desired.

### THE DEPARTMENT

## John Foster Dulles Completes Assignment With Department

[Released to the press March 25]

*Following is an exchange of letters between Secretary Acheson and John Foster Dulles:*<sup>1</sup>

MARCH 21, 1952

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have just written to the President that, the Senate having consented to the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the three Pacific Security Treaties, I assume that my particular official responsibility ends.

I want to thank you for the complete support which you have given me throughout this matter and I am deeply grateful for the trust and confidence which you and the President reposed in me and which has enabled me to share in this great task of building peace and security in the Pacific area.

It is perhaps appropriate for me also to mention how happy it has been for me to have had this association, not only with you, but with the many in the State Department who, under you, are rendering devoted and sacrificial service and who have consistently given me their good will and support.

I am

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Dulles has served as Consultant to the Secretary since Apr. 6, 1950.

MARCH 24, 1952

DEAR FOSTER: Thank you for your note of March 21st. Your letter of the same date was forwarded to the President. He has voiced the thoughts and appreciation of all of us for your great service and achievement.

May I add a personal word in response to your kind statement regarding me and your associates here in the Department? It has been a joy to work with you over these past years. Your grasp of the problems, your resourcefulness in solving them and your dedication to the task has made our association a very happy one.

I am particularly grateful that after the signature of the treaties in San Francisco, you were willing at the request of the President and myself to defer your return to private life so that your unique knowledge of the treaties and the negotiations could be made available to the Senate during its consideration of them.

You take with you the high esteem and affectionate regard of your many friends and colleagues in the Department, a company in which I am happy to be included.

Most sincerely,

DEAN ACHESON

### Appointment of Officers

Jack C. Corbett as director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy, effective March 28.

### Point Four Appointments

Tracy R. Welling as director of technical cooperation in Jordan, effective March 26.

Marcus J. Gordon as director of technical cooperation in Ethiopia, effective March 27.

Paul Duncan as director of the Program Information and Reports Staff of Tca, effective April 2.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**First Instrument of Revision of the Occupation Statute for Germany.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2255. Pub. 4270. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States, United Kingdom, and France—Signed at Bonn Mar. 6, 1951; entered into force Mar. 7, 1951.

**Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Costa Rica.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2256. Pub. 4271. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Costa Rica—Signed at San José Feb. 13, 1951; entered into force Feb. 13, 1951.

**What is Point Four?** Economic Cooperation Series 30. Pub. 4487. 12 pp. Free.

Address by Secretary of State Acheson Jan. 25, 1952.

**Restitution of Monetary Gold: Submission to an Arbitrator of Certain Claims With Respect to Gold Looted by the Germans from Rome in 1943.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2252. Pub. 4283. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States, United Kingdom, and France—Signed at Washington Apr. 25, 1951; entered into force Apr. 25, 1951.

**Agricultural Mission in El Salvador.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2262. Pub. 4286. 11 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador—Signed at San Salvador May 11, 1951; entered into force May 11, 1951.

**Economic Cooperation With Italy Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as amended.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2263. Pub. 4292. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Italy—Signed at Rome May 21, 1951; entered into force May 21, 1951.

**Economic Cooperation With France Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as amended.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2264. Pub. 4293. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and France—Signed at Paris May 22, 1951; entered into force May 22, 1951.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Mar. 31-Apr. 5, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (\*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

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†249	4/1	Kennan: Oath of office
250	4/1	Weil: Chairman U.N. Day, 1952
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254	4/2	Duncan: Information director, Point Four
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